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Jaime Battiste*

Understanding the Progression of
Mi'kmaw Law

Over the past 250 years, the recognition and implementation of the aboriginal
and treaty rights of the Santi Mawio'mi of the Mi'kmaq has been a hard and
bitter struggle for justice. Building on Mi'kmaw Aboriginal knowledge and legal
traditions that inform their aboriginal and treaty rights, the Supreme Court of
Canada has affirmed a Mi'kmaw right to hunt, fish, and gather in their traditional
territory. The author focuses on the progression of Mi'kmaw law, drawing on the
original teachings of the Mawio'mi embedded in Netukulimk and then shifting
to the current legal strategy that creates a constitutional jurisgensis and a
foundation for a long awaited constitutional reconciliation with the Mawiomi in
Atlantic Canada. The argument not only reaffirms the importance of language,
teachings, and history towards litigating Aboriginal law but also affirms the
preexisting Aboriginal sovereignty of the Mawiomi as understood in their creation
stories.

Au cours des 250 dernieres annees, la reconnaissance et la mise en ceuvre
des droits ancestraux et issus des trait~s du groupe Santi Mawio'mi de Ia nation
Mi'kmaq ont 6t6 une lutte longue et p~nible pour obtenir justice. Se fondant
sur les connaissances autochtones ancestrales et sur les traditions juridiques
qui sous-tendent leurs droits ancestraux et issus des trait6s, la Cour supreme
du Canada a affirm6 leur droit de chasser de p6cher et de r6colter sur leurs
territoires ancestraux. L'auteur se penche d'abord sur la progression de la loi
Mi'kmaw et s'inspire des enseignements originaux des Mawiomi enchjss~s
dans la notion de Netukulimk, puis il se tourne vers la strategie I6gale actuelle
qui met en place les conditions propices I la creation d'une loi constitutionnelle
et j un rapprochement espsr6 depuis longtemps avec les Mawio'mi du Canada
atlantique. Non seulement I'argument r~itere-t-il I'importance de la langue,
des enseignements et de I'histoire dans les litiges qui portent sur les droit des
Autochtones, mais ilaffirme 6galement la souverainet6 autochtone pr~existante
des Mawiomi telle qu'elle est d~crite dans leurs r6cits sur la crdation.
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Finally they met Nikanapekewisqw, Kluskap 's mother a woman whose
power lay in her ability to tell about the cycles of life or the future. She
said to Kluskap that she was a leaf on a tree that fell to the ground;
morning dew formed on the leaf and glistened while the sun, Niskam,
began itsjourney towards the midday sky. It was at midday when Niskam
gave life and a humanform to Kluskap s mother to bring.love, wisdom
and the colors of the world. The spirit and strength of Niskam entered
into Kluskap 's mother As part of the forest realm, she brought strength
and understanding; strength to withstand Earth "snaturalforces, and
understandingof the Mi'kmaq world, its animals, and her children, the
Mi 'kmaq and the understanding of the means of maintaining harmony
of the forces of nature. She told them that they will need understanding
and cooperation,so they can live in peace with one another

Introduction

Over the past 250 years, the recognition and implementation of the
aboriginal and treaty rights of the Mi'kmaq has been a hard and bitter
struggle for justice. Since the eighteenth-century treaties with the imperial
Crown, the colonialists in Atlantic Canada, by their personal action, elected
representatives and statutory law, have attempted to evade or terminate
the Aboriginal sovereignty, laws, government, territory and rights of the
Mi'kmaw Nation, the Santi Mawio 'mi. By a broad and lasting strategy,
1. I have heard this story most of my life. My translations and interpretation of the Mi'kmaw
creation story rely on two written and translated sources. The first is Stephen Augustine's English
translation of the Creation story, see Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
Looking Forward Looking Back, vol. I (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at
48-49 [RCAP Report]. Augustine's story on "Mi'kmaq Knowledge in the Mi'kmaq Creation Story:
Lasting Words and Deeds" (April 8 1977) online: <http://www.muiniskw.org/pgCulture3a.htm>.

This story was passed down to him from Augustine's grandmother, Agnes (Thomas) Augustine, who
heard it from her husband Thomas Theophile Augustine, otherwise known as "Basil Tom." Also, he
relied on information provided by his great-grandmother Isabel (Augustine) Simon, in a long-standing
family tradition. The other source is Reverend D. MacPherson in Souvenir of the Micmac Tercentenary
Celebration (St. Anne de Restigouche: Frhres Mineurs Capucins, 1910).
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they have sought to ignore the Mawio'mi's communal rights and replace
it with federally generated and structured band councils, organizations,
or individual entitlements. 2 The first prime minister of Canada, Sir John
A. Macdonald, informed Parliament that it would be Canada's goal "to
do away with the tribal system and assimilate the Indian people in all
respects with the inhabitants of the Dominion".3 Canada introduced the
elective band council system in 1869 as a way of undermining traditional
governance structures.' Through the power of the superintendent general
of Indian affairs, Canada attempted to force the traditional government of
the Mi'kmaq to adopt a municipal-style "responsible" government. The
deputy superintendent general of Indian affairs referred to the traditional
governance systems as "irresponsible". 5 This new system required that all
chiefs and councillors be elected for three-year terms, with election terms
and conditions to be determined by the superintendent general as he saw
fit.
Since 1869, the Mawio'mi has consistently rejected this replacement
process, but Canada has continually ignored it. For example, a 1960
federal order in council displaced the Mawio'mi in Nova Scotia by elected
band councils. 6 Then, in 1969, Canada unsuccessfully tried to transfer
the band councils to the provinces as municipalities.7 These legislative
and policy replacements have often been utilized to disregard the groupbased rights of the Mawio'mi and the obligations of the Crown toward the
Mawio'mi. And they are used to deny present federal responsibility for
the structural discrimination and inequalities of dispossession of territory
and treaty rights, forced assimilation, colonialism and racism.' Indeed, the
assimilative discourses and policies directed towards Mi'kmaq minimize
and reproduce systemic racism andconceal and evade colonial law and
its consequences. For example, Canada consistently denied any treaty
with the Mi'kmaq before 1985, when the Supreme Court's decision in

2.
This is an on-going process, which has a disjointed history, RCAP Report, ibid. at 141-48, 267310.
3. Ibid. at 179.
4.
An Act for the gradualenfranchisementof Indians, the bettermanagement of Indian affairs, and
to extend the provisions of the Act 31" Victoria, Chapter42, S.C. 1869, c. 6.
5.
RCAP Report, supra note 1, vol. I at 275.
6.
P.C. 1960-261.
7. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the Government of
Canadaon Indian Policy (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969); Sally M. Weaver, Making CanadianIndian
Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968- 70 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).
8.
RCAP Report, supra note 1, vol. I at 141-48.
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Simon affirmed the validity of the Treaty of 1752.' Canada has denied
the Mawio'mi rights to self-determination and human rights under the
International Covenant of Political and Civil Rights.'I Still, the Mawio'mi
and its aboriginal and treaty rights have been affirmed in constitutional
jurisprudence and in international human rights law.
Canada has acknowledged these past constitutional wrongs. In 1990,
the Court stated:
there can be no doubt that over the years the rights of the Indians were
often honoured in the breach (for one instance in a recent case in this
Court, see Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654). As
MacDonald J. stated in Pasco v. CanadianNationalRailway Co., [ 1986]
1 C.N.L.R. 35(B.C.S.C.), at p. 37: "We cannot recount with much pride
the treatment accorded to the native people of this country."
For many years, the rights of the Indians to their aboriginal lands certainly as legal rights - were virtually ignored. The leading cases
defining Indian rights in the early part of the century were directed at
claims supported by the Royal Proclamation or other legal instruments,
and even these cases were essentially concerned wit h settling legislative
jurisdiction or the rights of commercial enterprises. For fifty years after
the publication of Clement's The Law of the CanadianConstitution(3rd
ed. 1916), there was a virtual absence of discussion of any kind of Indian
rights to land even in academic literature. By the late 1960s, aboriginal
claims were not even recognized by the federal government as having
any legal status."
In January 1998, as part of its response to the report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Minister Jane Stewart issued a
Statement of Reconciliation:
Sadly, our history with respect to the treatment of Aboriginal people is
not something in which we can take pride. Attitudes of racial and cultural
superiority led to a suppression of Aboriginal culture and values. As a
country, we are burdened by past actions that resulted in weakening the
identity of Aboriginal peoples, suppressing their languages and cultures

9. Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387 [Simon]. This policy was based in part on the Rex
v. Syliboy, [1929] 50 c.c.c. 389 I D.L.R. 307 (Co. Ct.) decision, which was overturned in the Simon
decision.
10. The Mikmaq Tribal Society v.Canada,Communication No. 78/1980, for the entire case and Final
decision, 1991 See http://www.usask.ca/nativelaw/unhrfn/mikmaq.php. Also see UN GAOR Human
Rights Committee, 47" Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1992) 214. The enactment of the U.N.
Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/6I/L.67 (2007) has affirmed their right
to self-determination and the human rights of the Mawio'mi and other Indigenous peoples. Canada
voted against this Declaration. See James [Sa'ke'j] Youngblood Henderson, Indigenous Diplomacy
and the Rights ofPeoples: Achieving UN Recognition (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd., 2008).
11. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] I S.C.R. 1075 [Sparrow] at 49-50.
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and outlawing spiritual practices. We must recognize the impact of these
actions on the once self-sustaining nations that were disaggregated,
disrupted, limited or even destroyed by the dispossession of traditional
territory, by the relocation of Aboriginal people, and by some provisions
of the Indian Act. We must acknowledge that the result of these actions
was the erosion of the political, economic, and social systems of
Aboriginal people and nations. 2
In Gathering Strength--Canada's Aboriginal Action Plan (1998), the
federal Crown affirmed that treaties, both historic and modem, would
continue to be a key basis for the future relationship between Aboriginal
peoples and the Crown.
Since 1982, with the recognition and affirmation of aboriginal and
treaty rights in the patriated constitution of Canada, the courts were given
the power to protect constitutional rights. 3 Since 1985 the Supreme Court
has been managing the constitutional relationship with the Mawio'mi
against the dark shadow of a long history of injustice, grievances and
misunderstanding. It has been slowly and carefully defining the collective
constitutional rights--aboriginal and treaty rights- of the Mi'kmaq on a
case-by-case basis.' 4 However, this judicial management has allowed the
Crown to attempt to use the unjust past, resurrected as legitimate factual
history, as evidence against the constitutional rights of the Mawio'mi. In
two earlier landmark decisions, Simon and Marshall, the Court affirmed
aboriginal and treaty rights and for the most part reversed decisions of the
5
Nova Scotia courts.'
Once again in 2006, on another step on the long road to justice, the
Mi'kmaq gathered in great anticipation of a Court decision in R.v. Sappier;
R. v. Gray concerning an aboriginal and treaty right to harvest timber
for domestic usage, a right that New Brunswick had tried once again
to terminate. Their anticipation had been heightened, because the year
before, in Marshall-Bernard,they had failed in their attempts to provide
sufficient evidence to prove a commercial right to harvest trees under the6
trade provision of the 1760-61 Treaties or pursuant to aboriginal title.'

12. As reproduced in "Statement of Reconciliation: Learning from the Past" Nunatsiaq News (16
January 1998) online: <http'//www.nunatsiaq.com/archives/back-issues/week/80116.html>.
13. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. II [Constitution
Act, 1982].
14. Ibid. at s. 35.
15. See Simon, supra note 9, R. v. Denny (1990),55 C.C.C. (3d) 322 as approved by Sparrow, supra
note 11 at para. 79; R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 [Marshall]Lamer C.J. and L'Heureux-Dub,
Cory, lacobucci and Binnie JJ. for the majority; Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. dissenting.. See also R. v.
Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 [Marshall-Bernard].
16. Ibid.
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In the Sappier-Graydecision, the Court affirmed that the Mi'kmaq and
Maliseet had an aboriginal right to harvest timber for domestic usage.
While the Sappier-Gray decision was a significant victory for the
Mi'kmaq people, the implementation of the decisions by either the federal
or provincial Crown has been slow and resistant, which continues to
reveal a weakness in the justice system. It is not just historical grievances
behind the Crown's inaction that have hurt the constitutional rights of the
Mi'kmaq people. Even the court victories in which the Mi'kmaq have
prevailed have also harmed them because the court engaged in a limited
analysis and the Crown failed to implement these rights.
The Mi'kmaq continue to be disheartened and frustrated by legislation,
bureaucracy and administrative steps taken to corrupt their inherent and
treaty rights. Neither the federal nor the provincial Crown has a coherent
policy for implementing the constitutional rights of the Mi'kmaq. Only
time and effort by the Mi'kmaq will tell whether the Crown will implement
existing constitutional commitments. The harm to the Mi'kmaq that arises
out of the delayed constitutional implementation is economical, political,
and cultural and is not consistent with constitutional supremacy."1
However, the Mi'kmaq, in their self-determined way, continue to press
for the recognition and implementation of their rights in Canadian society.
Long after the recognition and affirmation of aboriginal and treaty rights
in the Constitution, the Mi'kmaq await reconciliation of the past and a
relationship with governments that truly reflect past promises.
What this paper will attempt to point out is the structure of aboriginal
and treaty rights of the Mawio'mi and the current paradox in their
interpretation and implementation both by the federal and provincial
Crown and by us as Mi'kmaq people. It will try to recommend future
treaty and constitutional reconciliation in which Mi'kmaq can exercise
their constitutional rights and prosper. I write this paper from the view of a
Mi'kmaw scholar, and a legal advisor to Mawio'mi, the traditional Grand
Council of the Mi'kmaw Nation. It is written from within the Mi'kmaw
legal traditions as it merges with constitutional law regarding aboriginal
and treaty rights.
I. Sappier-Gray decision
The Sappier-Graydecision was the last in a trilogy regarding Mi'kmaw
harvesting of their traditional territory. Previously, the Court in Simon and
in Marshallhad affirmed the Mi'kmaw treaty rights to hunt and fish. The

17. Re Reference by the Governor General in Council Concerning Certain Questions Relating to the
Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at paras. 70-78 [Quebec Secession Reference].
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New Brunswick Crown charged Dale Sappier and Clark Polchies (both
Maliseet) and Darrell Gray (a Mi'kmaq) with unlawful possession of or
cutting of Crown timber from Crown lands contrary to provincial law.
Each cut and took the logs from lands traditionally harvested by their First
Nations. At trial, each person asserted that he possessed an aboriginal
and treaty right to harvest timber and he had no intention of selling the
logs or any product made from them, but that the logs were intended for
their personal use. Sappier took them to build a house and for community
firewood. Those cut by Grey were to be used to make furniture and
moldings for his home.
The trial courts acquitted them of the Crown's charges, but on the basis
of different constitutional rights. Sappier and Polchies had valid treaty
rights, while Gray had a valid aboriginal right. Both Sappier and Polchies
were acquitted because a valid 1725-1726 treaty with the Maliseet Nation
existed and created treaty rights to harvest timber, but they were held not
to have an aboriginal right." The Court of Queen's Bench' 9 and the Court
of Appeal20 upheld these acquittals and dismissed the Crown's appeal. The
Crown appealed these decisions to the Supreme Court of Canada.
In Gray, the trial court held that the Mi'kmaq benefited from an
aboriginal right to gather and harvest wood for personal use on the
traditional lands of Gray's Mi'kmaw ancestors, but denied the existence
of a benefit from the 1752 and 1779 treaty with the Mawio'mi creating a
18. R. v. Sappier, 2003 NBPC 2, [2003] 2 C.N.L.R. 294. The Crown admitted that the Treaty of
1725 and the ratification thereof in 1726 are valid Treaties and that the defendants are beneficiaries
of those Treaties. The Crown's concession about the validity of the Treaty is one of law. The trial
judge confirmed the harvesting clause of the 1725 Treaty that confirmed the right of the Maliseet and
Mi'kmaq peoples to "not be molested in their persons, Hunting, Fishing and Planting Grounds nor in
any other [of] their Lawful Occasions by His Majesty's Subject or their Dependents". He found that
lawful occasions included the right to harvest wood from forests for personal use. In rejecting the
Aboriginal rights, Cain Prov.Ct. J. opined that any human society living on the same lands at the same
time would have used wood and wood products for the same purposes. On this basis, he held that the
practice of using wood to construct shelters or to make furniture was not in any way integral to the
distinctive culture of the ancestors of the Woodstock First Nation. The learned trial judge ultimately
concluded that the culture of this pre-contact society would not have been fundamentally altered
had wood not been available for use because the Maliseet would probably have found some other
available material to use in its place. The Supreme Court in Sappier-Gray, infra note 21 at para. 64
noted that, "The Treaty of 1725 was negotiated in Boston by the Penobscots and ratified by Mi'kmaq
representatives at Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia, in 1726." However, it did not pronounce on the
validity or geographical scope of the 1725 Treaty.
19. R.v. Sappier,2003 NBQB 389, [2004]2 C.N.L.R. 281.
20. R. v. Sappier and Polchies 2004 NBCA 56, 273 N.B.R. (2d) 93. Robertson J.A., writing on
behalf of the Court of Appeal, emphasized that a practice need not be distinct in order to found an
Aboriginal right claim - it need only be integral to a distinctive culture. In his view, the fact that tree
harvesting was undertaken for survival purposes, and that perhaps any human society would have
done the same, was not determinative. Moreover, in direct response to Cain Prov. Ct. J.'s reasons,
Robertson J.A. queried what other resource could have been used had timber not been available.
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right to harvest timber.2' Gray's acquittal on aboriginal rights was set aside
by the Court of Queen's Bench, 22 which found that the evidence presented
at trial was insufficient to conclude that furniture-making for personal use
was a central defining feature of the Mi'kmaw culture. 3 Gray appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeal on the grounds of the lower court's denial
of his defense of aboriginal right, but he did not pursue his treaty rights
claim. The Court of Appeal found that he had made a successful claim for
an aboriginal right to harvest timber for domestic or personal use at trial,
and rejected the Crown's extinguishment argument. 24 The Crown did not
attempt to justify the legislative infringement. The Crown appealed the
Court of Appeal decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court dismissed both crown appeals, holding that in
both cases the involved Maliseets and Mi'kmaq had an aboriginal right
to harvest wood for domestic uses on Crown lands traditionally used for
that purpose by Maliseet and Mi'kmaw society.26 The decision concluded
that Mi'kmaq and Maliseet had a right to use the harvested timber for
the construction of a modem dwelling,27 and for "communities' domestic
needs for such things as shelter, transportation, tools, and fuel". 2"
The Court declared that the Crown had not discharged its burden
of proving that these aboriginal rights had been extinguished by preConfederation and post-Confederation statutes.2 9 It emphasized that the
power to extinguish aboriginal rights in the colonial period rested with
the imperial Crown,30 and it was unclear whether the colonial legislature
had ever been granted the legal authority to extinguish aboriginal rights.3'
Even if the colonial legislature did have such authority, the Court found
that the legislation relied upon by the New Brunswick Crown as proof
21. R. v. Sappier;R. v. Gray, 2006 SCC 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686 at paras. 15-16 [Sappier-Gray].The
trial judge in Sappier, supra note 18 at 19-31, noted the unreported trial court decision in Gray and
restated the Court's opinion in R. v. Sundown where the Court held that the construction of a log cabin
was a reasonable incident to a treaty right to hunt. He stated: "And I would say if the Supreme Court
of Canada has recognized as part of the tradition and the lifestyle of aboriginals that one can be able
to build a hunting shelter, surely if the Court were confronted with a situation as to whether one could
use wood to build a year-round shelter, that the decision ought to be similar." at para. 22.
22. R. v. Gray, 2004 NBCA 57, [2004] 4 C.N.L.R. 204 [Gray].
23. Sappier-Gray,supra note 21 at para. 17. This characterization narrowed the trial court decision.
24. Gray, supra note 22.
25. Sappier-Gray,supra note 21 at para. 54-55.
26. Ibid. at paras. 21, 24-26, 72.
27. Ibid. at para 48.
28. Ibid. at para. 24.
29. Ibid. at paras. 56-61.
30. Ibid. at para. 58, relying on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at para. 15
[Delgammukw].
31. Ibid. at para. 58. Compare to the silence of a colonial proclamation in Marshall-Bernard,supra
note 15, at paras. 97-105.
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of extinguishment was primarily regulatory in nature.32 It held that the
regulation of Crown timber through a licensing scheme did not meet the
high standard of demonstrating a clear and plain intent to extinguish the
aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses.33 The Crown had made
no attempt to justify this infringement.
The Court did not decide whether Sappier and Polchies or Gray also
would benefit from a treaty right to harvest wood for personal uses.34
The Court stressed that aboriginal rights are founded upon practices,
customs, or traditions that are distinctive of the pre-contact culture of an
Aboriginal people. The Court affirmed that an aboriginal right could be
based on evidence showing the importance of a resource to the pre-contact
culture of an aboriginal people. When direct evidence is not available,
courts must be flexible and be prepared to draw necessary inferences
about the existence and integrality of a practice -and the importance of the
resource.
In the Mi'kmaw context, the trial court relied heavily on the evidence
of a recognized elder and historian, Mr. Gelbert Sewell, a Mi'kmaq and
status Indian, who was declared an expert, "regarding oral traditions and
customs which have been passed down through the generations and more
particularly in the field of describing practices and customs relating to
the use of and gathering of wood by aboriginals in the geographical area
encompassed by the terms of the charge".35 Mr. Sewell's evidence was not
contradicted by the Crown on cross-examination or by the introduction of
any other documentary or historical evidence.

32. Ibid. at para. 59.
33. Ibid. at paras. 57-60.
34. Ibid. at para. 3.
35. R. v. Gray, New Brunswick Provincial Court (No. 03190311, August 27, 2001) at 3. T. Arsenault
Prov. Ct. J. stated that: "I have found and I do find that the evidence of Mr. Sewell was reliable
and extremely useful to this court and I might point out that it was in no way diminished by crossexamination nor did the Crown in this case elect to contradict it by any documentary evidence or the
evidence of any historian" ibid. at 23.
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Mr. Sewell testified about the Mi'kmaw practices and uses for wood,36
concluding that, "so, as far back as I can read in history or the oral tradition
that has been passed down to me, it's been - we've been always gathering
and we've been always using wood as, as, as a way of life".37 This evidence,
detailing the many uses to which the Mi'kmaq put wood, is important
given the communal nature of aboriginal rights. The trial judge accepted
this evidence as proof that the practice of harvesting wood for domestic
uses was integral to the pre-contact Mi'kmaq way of life.
The Court found enough evidence to reveal that the Mi'kmaw way of
life during the pre-contact period was that of migratory peoples who lived
from fishing and hunting and who used the rivers and lakes of Eastern
Canada for transportation. The record showed that wood was used to fulfill
the communities' domestic needs for such things as shelter, transportation,
tools and fuel. From this evidence, the Court inferred that the practice
of harvesting wood for domestic uses was significant, though undertaken
primarily for survival purposes.3" A practice undertaken for survival
purposes can be considered critically important and integral to the precontact Maliseet and Mi'kmaq. A practice of harvesting wood for domestic
uses undertaken in order to survive is directly related to the pre-contact
way of life and meets the "integral to a distinctive culture" threshold.39
The Court has stressed that within the context of the pre-contact
distinctive culture of the Mawio'mi, "culture" is an inquiry into the precontact way of life of a particular Aboriginal society, including means of
survival, socialization methods, legal systems, and, potentially, trading
habits. Relying on the Mi'kmaw Grand Council legal advisors, Russel
Barsh and Sakej Henderson, Bastarache J. stated that:
The term Culture as it is used in the English language may not find a
perfect parallel in certain Aboriginal languages... we can find no precise
equivalent of European concepts of "culture" in Mi'kmaq, for example.
36. Ibid.at para. 16-19. He spoke of using the inner bark of a cedar tree for rope, and of cutting strips
of it to be used in the construction of the old birch bark canoes. Birch bark and ash were used to make
baskets. Birch, poplar and black spruce were fashioned into paddles. Any leftover birch or maple was
used for firewood. He spoke of using cedar to make drums, and of how the Aboriginal peoples were
also carvers. He testified that some of the figureheads on the first ships to arrive in Canada were done
by Aboriginals. Mr. Sewell spoke of building camps and making pots out of wood. He testified that
the pots were made out of large logs, using fire first to bum out the centre and then chiselling it out. He
spoke of using bird's eye maple and curly maple in the construction of axe handles and boat paddles,
either for sale or for gifts. He confirmed that the extraction of sap from maple and birch trees had been
known to the Mi'kmaq for centuries. Finally, he spoke of the practice of fashioning spears for fishing
out of ash.
37. Ibid. at para. 31, relying on A.R., vol. 1,at 81.
38. Ibid. at paras. 27-28, 33.
39. Ibid. at paras. 38, 45-48.
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How we maintain contact with our traditions is tan telo 'tlieki-p. How
we perpetuate our consciousness is described as tiilnuo 'lti'k. How we
maintain our language is tlinuita'sim. Each of these lerms connotes a
process rather then a thing. Ultimately, the concept of culture itself is
inherently cultural."4

The Court's reliance on Mi'kmaw language is an important step in analyzing
Mi'kmaw way of life and culture. It is the revealing force behind their oral
traditions, songs, and ceremonies. A court, therefore, must first inquire
into the way of life of the pre-contact peoples and seek to understand
how the particular pre-contact practice relied upon by the rights claimants
relates to that way of life as expressed by their language.
In Sappier-Gray, the Court clarified the meaning of "distinctive
culture". The Crown and some interveners argued that only cultural
traits that are distinct or unique to that nation would be considered an
aboriginal right. The Crown argued that cutting trees for personal usage
was not a "distinctive" enough trait of the Mi'kmaq to be an aboriginal
right; instead, it stated that any human society would practice this trait for
survival and it was not integral to that specific culture. The Court affirmed
the rejection of this argument, stating, "Section 35 seeks to protect integralelements of the way of life of these aboriginal societies, including their
traditional means of survival."4 1 The Court explained that the qualifier
"distinctive" incorporates an element of aboriginal specificity but does not
mean "distinct".
The nature of the practice of an aboriginal right cannot be frozen in its
pre-contact form but rather it can evolve into a modem practice protected
as an aboriginal right determined in light of present-day circumstances. The
Court established in Simon that treaty provisions should be interpreted "in
a flexible way that is sensitive to the evolution of changes in normal"
practice and confirms that courts should not use a "frozen-in-time"
approach to treaty rights.42 In Sappier-Gray,the Court translated the precontact practice into a modem harvesting of wood for certain domestic
uses that are directly associated with that particular way of life.43
40. Ibid. at para. 44.
41. Ibid. at para. 40. One should note that in a treaty rights analysis the access to resources and
activities are not characterized as "traditional", Marshall, supra note 15 at para. 4, ("In my view,
the 1760 treaty does affirm the right of the Mi'kmaq people to continue to provide for their own
sustenance by taking the products of their hunting, and other gathering activities and trading for what
in 1760 was termed 'necessaries"') and paras. 7, 56, 66.
42. Simon, supra note 9 at 402.
43. Sappier-Gray,supranote 21 at para. 24. In another case, the Court has held that the construction
of temporary shelters must be allowed to evolve into the construction of a modem dwelling, R. v.
Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393 at paras. 29-33.
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The majority of the Court, in the words of Justice Bastarache,
characterized this aboriginal right as having no commercial dimension.'
He limited the exercise of this right in modem Maliseet and Mi'kmaw
communities. The harvested wood cannot be sold, traded or bartered to
produce assets or raise money, even if the object of such trade or barter is
to finance the building of a dwelling.45 Justice Binnie, however, disagreed
with this commercial limitation. He noted that barter (and its modem
equivalent, sale) within the reserve or other local Aboriginal community
would reflect a more efficient use of human resources than requiring all
members of the community to do everything for themselves. 46 But he
agreed that any trade, barter or sale of wood outside a reserve or other
local Aboriginal community where the person lives would represent a
commercial activity outside the scope of the aboriginal right established
in this case. 47 This analysis continues to confuse the pre-contact territories
and activities in the constitutional framework with federal law and policy,
a point I vill address later. When combined with the lack of evidence on
Mi'kmaw legal traditions and existing treaty rights of the Mi'kmaq this
fragmented analysis lacks depth. 48 However, the Court noted that very
little evidence was led at trial with respect to the Maliseet and Mi'kmaw
legal traditions or the actual harvesting practices. This is unfortunate,
because it prevented the Court from understanding aboriginal rights from
Mi'kmaw legal traditions and its sources. Instead it had to rely on the
practices of the Mi'kmaw, implying that no Mi'kmaw law regulated these
practices.
II. Mi 'kmaw legal traditionsand Netukulimk
The relationship between the Mi'kmaq and the forest ecosystem is more
intimate than suggested in court. It is foundational to their worldview,
integral to their legal traditions, and constitutional rights. This evidence
was not before the courts, but it would have been useful to the courts

44. Compare to Marshall-Bernard, supra note 15, where the Court rejected a commercial right to
harvest because on the wording of the trade claue t- .-,d in the 1760-61 Treaties witli the Mi'kmaq
and a claim for Aboriginal title of the Mi'kmaq in ,ne Miramichi because of an absence of evidence at
trial court.
45. Sappier-Gray, supra note 21 at para. 25.
46. Ibid. at para. 74.
47. Ibid.
48. Marshall, supra note 15 at para. 42. ("1 mentioned earlier that the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
has held on several occasions that the "peace and friendship" treaties with the Mi'kmaq did not
extinguish aboriginal hunting and fishing rights in Nova Scotia: R. v. Isaac (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460
[Isaac], R. v. Cope (1981), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 36, Denny, supra.")
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if properly presented as part of Mi'kmaq constitutional law,49 as well
as the foundation of aboriginal and treaty rights as constitutional law
of Canada. The relationship between the forest and Mi'kmaq people is
deeply embodied in the Mi'kmaq knowledge system and legal traditions,
a relationship beginning with the Creation story.
The Court has held-that oral traditions, testimony, songs, and
ceremonies were important to give direction to the courts in aboriginal
right cases.5" Courts are required to give value and proper weight to the
aboriginal legal system. In recognizing aboriginal title by the Gitksan and
Wet'suwet'en, the Court found that "[h]ad the oral histories been correctly
assessed [at trial], the conclusion on these issues of fact [regarding
ownership of, and jurisdiction over, the traditional territories] might have
been very different."'" In Marshall-Bernard,the Court had affirmed that
evidence of oral history is admissible, providing that it meets the standards
of usefulness and reasonable reliability. 2
Researching and understanding Indigenous laws from within
Indigenous perspectives has been a passion of Professor John Borrows, one
53 At a conference
of the scholars the Court relied upon in Sappier-Gray.

49. Russel Lawrence Barsh, "Mi'kmaw (Micmaq) Constitutional Law", in Bruce Elliott Johansen,
ed. The Encyclopedia of Native American Legal Traditions, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998)
at 192-209 [Mi 'kmaw ConstitutionalLaw].
50. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 68 ("In determining whether an aboriginal
claimant has produced evidence sufficient to demonstrate that her activity is an aspect of a practice,
custom or tradition integral to a distinctive aboriginal culture, a court should approach the rules of
evidence, and interpret the evidence that exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal
claims, and of the evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there
were no written records of the practices, customs and traditions engaged in. The courts must not
undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not
conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied in, for example, a private law
torts case"); Delgamuukw, supra note 30 at para. 87 ("Notwithstanding the challenges created by the
use of oral histories as proof of historical facts, the laws of evidence must be adapted in order that this
type of evidence can be accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the types of historical
evidence that courts are familiar with, which largely consists of historical documents. This is a longstanding practice in the interpretation of treaties between the Crown and aboriginal peoples: Sioui,
supra, at 1068; R. v. Taylor ... at p. 232. To quote Dickson C.J., given that most aboriginal societies
"did not keep written records", the failure to do so would "impose an impossible burden of proof' on
[A]boriginal peoples, and "render nugatory" any rights that they have (R. v. Simon, ... at p. 408). This
process must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.")
51. Delgamuukw, supra note 30 at para. 84-108, specifically at para. 107. The Court stated at para.
3 that the judicial treatment of oral histories of Aboriginal peoples and important practical problems
relevant to the proof of Aboriginal rights and title are "endemic to aboriginal rights litigation
generally".
52. Marshall-Bernard,supra note 15 at para. 70.
53. Sappier-Gray,supra note 21 at para 45. See John Borrows, Recovering Canada. The Resurgence
of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) and "Indigenous legal traditions in
Canada" (2005) 19 Journal of Law & Policy 167.
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hosted by the Dalhousie Aboriginal Law Student Association in 2005,
Professor Borrows aptly commented:
The future of aboriginal law will be determined by Aboriginal people
researching their language and their culture for the true answers, because
it is within the language and Indigenous laws that keys to the future of
our rights will be decided. 4
Proper judicial consideration of Indigenous knowledge, legal traditions,
languages and culture opens up the courts to a better understanding of
aboriginal rights. These Indigenous evidences offer deep internal meanings
that can be quite valuable to the clarification of aboriginal and treaty rights.
However, such evidences cannot be learned in books; they are part of the
language and oral traditions. It is in the places where Mi'kmaq gather,
such as in ceremonies, Sweat Lodges, cultural meetings, births, wakes and
funerals, and visiting Elders, that this knowledge and law are transmitted.
These sources are still unfamiliar to the existing rules of evidence and
judges have difficulty in comprehending them and giving them proper
weight.
Mi'kmaw oral teachings, legal tradition, and ceremonies involve
legends, stories, teachings of advisors, and narratives handed down
through the generations.55 They are neither linear nor steeped in theories
of historical or social progress and evolution. It is not a human-centred
narrative, and it does not assume that human beings are anything more
56
than one element in the natural order of the ecosystem.
In the Mi'kmaw understanding, time and history form a specific space
that is filled with experiences and feelings. Talking about the past involves
describing dreams and experiences: characters, events, and objects. No
single account explains the collective past of the Mi'kmaq, nor does
everyone know every specific detail of an event or know that event in the
same amount of detail, but each person takes a certain place as a starting
point for a discussion that is sometimes narrative, sometimes not. The
progression of time is connected to the specific lives of known people;

"54. John Borrows, Keynote Address
- .
L tElmi "knik: for the fitture of the Mi'kmaw
people, delivered at the Faculty of i .h. .... "- -rsity, February 18, 2005) [unpublished].
55. Stephen Augustine, "Prefa.
iral History and Oral rradition" in Rende Hulan and Renate
Eigenbrod, Aboriginal Oral Traditions: Theory, Practice, Ethics (Halifax and Winnipeg: Fernwood
and Gorsebrook Research Institute, 2008) [Mi 'kmaw Traditions] at 2-4 (oral history and oral tradition
in Mi'kmaw language are one and the same, no differences exist between them); J. Borrows, "Listening
for a Change: The Courts and Oral Traditions", (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1;RCAP Report, supra
note I vol. I (Looking Forward, Looking Back) at 33.
56. Russel Lawrence Barsh, "Netukulimk Past and Present: Mikmaw Ethics and the Atlantic Fishery"
(2002) 37(1) Printemps 15 [Netukulimk].
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in other words, it is linked with memory and not with chronological time.
Often no account deals with any fixed chronological time and dates for
events can only be approximated.
The hereditary Mi'kmaw chief for the New Brunswick district
(Sigenigteoag) and kep'ten of the Santi Mawio 'mi, Stephen Augustine,
has presented such evidence of the creation story of the Mi'kmaq in other
cases.

57

The creation story.of the Mi'kmaw establishes the relations between
the Mi'kmaq and their ecology; it also generates Mi'kmaw knowledge
and legal traditions behind their aboriginal and treaty rights.58 Mi'kmaq
knowledge is at the root of the oral tradition and ceremonies and in the
teachings, stories, and performances that are passed down from generation
to generation.
The teaching of creation among the Mi'kmaq,5 9 which also creates their
legal traditions, begins with the life-giver, Kisu'ulk,6 ° who generates the
first bolts of lightning that unfold the grandfather sun (Naku set), the dry
Mother earth (Wsitqamu'k), the organism that generates the atmosphere
(Kluskap), and unfolds its great cycles of nature. These lessons create the
Mi'kmaw legal traditions and law of netukulimk.
The spark people or fire peoples created the ancestors of the Mi'kmaq
who awoke in the world, ignorant of everything in it. Mi'kmaw teachings
say the people asked the life-giver how they should live. They were told
to watch the sun, sky, and water and lands in the environment, and told to
learn from the animals, fish, birds and the plants. They learned how and
when to pray, to respect the nations Of animals and fish, and to respect the
nations of the trees and their dependents; they learned the vitality of the
stars, the constellations, and the Milky Way, which is the path their spirits
take to the other world. Most important of all lessons, they learned to live
together as one people, kinuk, in harmony with all other humans, animals,
61
and plants.
57. Courts have had difficulty characterizing hereditary chief and Kep'ten Augustine's vast expertise.
He is usually qualified by the courts as an expert ethno-historian able to give expert opinion evidence
on the Aboriginal peoples and the Aboriginal perspective on Aboriginal-European relationships in
Eastern North America, includilg the language, culture, and oral traditions and oral history of the
Mi'kmaq Nation.
58. James [Sa'ke'j] Youngblood Henderson, First Nations Jurisprudence and Aboriginal Rights
(Saskatoon, SK: Native Law Centre, 2006).
59. Stephen Augustine's English translation of the Creation story, supra note 1.
60. In the Mi'kmaw language, Kisu 'uk is a spiritual force. In the English language it should be
translated as a verb or an action, rather than a person or a noun.
61. Marie Ann Battiste, "A History of the Grand Council to 1800" in Russel Barsh, Sakej Henderson,
and Bernie Francis, ed. Mi "kmaqGrand Council, State Papers[ForeignAffairs] 1977-1984, (Chapel
Island, Mawio'mi,1984) at 1.
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Through the endless process of transmission of knowledge
and ceremonies, the Mi'kmaq come to understand their values and
responsibilities to the environment and families. Mi'kmaw knowledge
is centred on the process of sustaining a shared worldview, a cognitive
solidarity, and a tradition of responsible action that combines the teaching
of rights with responsibilities. 62 The aboriginal land tenure and rights
derived from netukulimk cannot be separated from their sovereignty or
governance or law of the Mi'kmaw territory. Netukulimk and its laws are
not based on race. It is usually based on kinship ties, specialized access
to resources, and a high degree of equality and diversity. Mi'kmaq do not
speak of living "there"; rather, each family or person "belongs" to a family
and a space or territory. Belonging is a special responsibility of Mi'kmaw
sovereignty, governance, and the law of netukulimk shapes other laws,
legal choices, and placement. Ultimately, the law of netukulimk affirms
the value of sharing as a standard of life.
Netukulimk is the responsibility to maintain the ecology and the
human order using the principles of belonging and respect. It refers to the
responsibilities and actions of the Mi'kmaw, thus it has been translated
into human kinship relationships as a general analogy for ecological
relations. The Grandmother and the Marten generate the relationship
of life within the territory of the Mi'kmaq, the Nephew generates the
relationship between life within the sea and the rivers of the territory, and
the Mother generates the relationship between the plant lives within the
territory. The Creation story thus animates the relationships central to how
the Court has affirmed these relationships as aboriginal and treaty rights
65 . In Simon, the Court affirmed
64 , and Sappier-Gray
in Simon 63 , Marshall
the harvest to hunt land life; in Marshallthe right to harvest the sea life; in
Sappier-Gray,the Court affirmed the right to harvest the trees. These cases
generate a modern constitutional jurisgenesis that is harmonious with the
Mi'kmaq creation narrative.

62. Albert Marshall, Chair of the Unamaki Elders Senate (Keynote Address presented to the
Canadian Aboriginal Science and Technology Conference "Spirit of the East", 23 September 2005)
[unpublished].
63. Simon, supra note 9.
64. Marshall, supra note 15. See Russel Lawrence Barsh and James (sa'ke'j) Youngblood Henderson,
"Marshalling the Rule of Law in Canada: Of Eels and Honour." (1999) 11(1) Constitutional Forum
1-18; Ken S. Coates, The MarshallDecision andNative Rights (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 2000); Kiera L. Ladner, "Up The Creek: Fishing For A New Constitutional Order" (76"' Annual
Conference Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, 3 June 2004), online at <http://www.
cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2004/Ladner.pdf>.
65. Sappier-Gray,supra note 2 1.
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In the Mi'kmaw legal traditions, netukulimk has always been expressed
as the legal processes of sustaining relationships or what is called in the
English land tenure system, conservation or sustainability. Consistent with
the verb-oriented reality enfolded in the Mi'kmaw language66--a process
of being with the universe-netukulink was (and is) a widely shared,
dynamic, and interrelated worldview that connects all things. The system
of kinship relations unites everyone in a web of complementary rights and
responsibilities. This order is non-hierarchical and reproduces itself without
the need to accumulate more people, more land, or more goods. The most
obvious and widespread manifestation of this reciprocal relationship is
the totemic clan system. The clan system categorizes respectful ecological
relationships as well as legal obligations, such as sharing and deference.
This is a shared responsibility with the netukulimk under Mi'kmaw law.
Conservation is an ambiguous constitutional category in Canada. It is not
an express power of either the federal or provincial Crown, but it is linked
to the aboriginal and treaty rights of the Mawio'mi;' its reconciliation is
necessary for everyone.
The Sappier-Graydecision is a significant affirmation of another part
of the Mi'kmaw legal tradition. It affirms the relationship of the Mi'kmaq
to their environment in the form of plant life. This case begins to recognize
constitutionally and affirm the Mi'kmaw relationship to the plant kingdom,
the green growing entities that provide the atmosphere for the earth. It
protects the knowledge of herbs and plants for different purposes. It
affirms the Mi'kmaq creation story, and in this case represents the meaning
of Nikanapekewisqw (Kluscap's mother) who came from a leaf of a tree to
bring the knowledge of how to sustain and harvest the plant kingdom. The
Mi'kmaq.conceptualize plants and animals with a certain mntu (force) and
consider them to be separate nations that are related to the Mi'kmaq. In an
endless cycle, each life form is viewed as both a producer and a consumer
with respect to the others. In the Mi'kmaw context, the right to harvest
wood is part of the netukulimk, and is derived from pre-contact Mi'kmaw
legal traditions of the Mi'kmaq, or its pre-contact legal system.
Both the Mawio'mi in its Netuklimkewe 'l declarations67 and the Crown
express concern that recognition of conservation is needed to prevent

66. Marie Battiste and James [Sa'ke'j] Youngblood Henderson, Protecting Indigenous Knowledge
and Heritage (Saskatoon: Purich, 2000) at 50; Stephanie H. Inglis, Speakers Experience: A Study of
Mi'kmaq Modality (2002) [unpublished, archived at Memorial University Library]; Helga Lomosits,
"Future is not a tense" online: <http://www.inst.at/trans/15Nr/01_2/lomositsl5.htm>.
67. For example, Netuklimkewe'l, proclaimed and published by the later Kjisaqmaw, Donald
Marshall on Treaty Day (October 1), 1986, regulated moose hunting under the Simon decision, supra
note 9.
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the uncontrollable and excessive exploitation of the natural resources of
Atlantic Canada. Netukulimk is the part of Mi'kmaw constitutional law
that inherently limits the quantities of those entitled to share in the various
and seasonal harvests. 68 In its previous analysis of the treaties with the

Mi'kmaw, the courts have found it is implied that the Crown recognized
and accepted the existing Mi'kmaq way of life and that itagreed that they
69
could continue their hunting, fishing and gathering lifestyle.
Similar to most forms of Indigenous knowledge, Mi'kmaw knowledge
and jurisprudence is based on an organic and knowable totality that is
more important than any of its particular manifestations.7" It is a complete
system of knowledge with its own concepts of epistemology, and its own
ways of knowing nature, events, ideas, and human consciousness.7 The
diverse manifestations of this knowledge system can best be learned by
means employed by Mi'kmaw families, including language, ceremonies,
practices, and teachings,72 and those who teach Mi'kmaw knowledge
usually begin from a place where the land and its ecology are understood.
III. Sovereignty of the Santi Mawio'mi
The sovereignty of the Mawio'mi is derived from Mi'kmaw knowledge
and legal traditions. The creation story explains the origins of the
Mawio'mi and its sovereignty.73 Lightning bolts, sent by the life giver,
created a Great Spirit fire. Out of the fire, the life giver generated sparks
that created seven women and then seven men. These peoples created the
seven families, who learned from Kisu 'ulk how to live. The original term
for seven families created by the Great Spirit fire in the creation story was
nu 'k (or 'fnu 'k), "the people." The term "Mi 'kmaq" refers to one of the
seven families; it is derived from our language meaning "my relations".
The six other Algonquian families that extend across North America are
the Innu (Montagnais, Naskapi, Attikamekw) to the north, the Wabanaki
Confederacy (Abenaki, Maliseet, Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, Wampenoag,
Narragansett) and the Lenapi or Delaware Confederation to the south; to
68. Mi'kmaw Constitutional Law, supro note 49; Netukulimk, supra note 56.
69. Marshall,supra note 15 at paras. 19, 37-38.
70. Mi'kmaw Constitutional Law, supra note 49. See RCAP Report, supranote I vol. 4, (Perspectives
and Realities) at 454 for the view that Aboriginal knowledge "is a cumulative body of knowledge and
beliefs, handed down through generations by cultural transmission, about the relationship of living
beings (including humans) with one another and their environment."
71. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Commission
on Human Rights, United Nations Economic and Social Council, PreliminaryReport of the Special
Rapporteur Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, UN ESC 1994, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1994/31 [PreliminaryReport of the Special Rapporteur] at para. 8.
72. Sappier-Gray,supra note 21 at paras. 21 and 34.
73. Creation story, supra note 1.
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the west are the Anishenabi and Three Fires society in the central part of
the west, the Eeyouchi or Cree Confederation of the northwest, and the
Nitsi-pol-yiksi or Blackfoot Confederation and allies of the Plains of the
southwest.
Mi'kmaw sovereignty is a consensual and spiritual alliance of seven
related clans of relatives, each with their own districts. It arose as the
relatives learned to live together as one people, kinuk, in harmony with
their relatives and ecosystem. These relatives are united by the cognitive
solidarity of maintaining the teachings of the Great Spirit fire and the seven
sacred fires (tjipokteo orjipuktea). After the passing of seven winters, the
seven clans come back with their seven fires to rekindle the Great Spirit
fire and the teachings of Life-Giver, Grandfather Sun (Naku 'set), Mother
Earth (wsitqamu 'k), and the Atmosphere (Kluskap). They generated the
Mi'kmaw ceremony for the renewal of the alliance of the seven clans.
These people of wisdom and responsibility joined together in a circle'to
discuss shared interests and issues. This ceremony, over the generations,
generated the Mawio 'mi, or sacred gathering.
The Mi'kmaq became a united confederation, speaking their own
language, free in the enjoyment of their.own knowledge and traditions,
and governed by their own laws and officers in their own territory. They
retained the organization through extended family structures, shared
ceremonies and dialogical gatherings.74
These ceremonies unified the seven districts of the clans (sakamowti),
established their sovereignty over a territory and people and certain
harvesting places under the responsibility of certain families. From each
district of kinsmen and their dependents (wikamow), thenational members
of Mawio'mi were selected for life by the families to represent the collective
interest over the territory. Each year the Mawio'mi met at least twice on
governance issues. It considered laws and policy of the netukulimk and the
nikminen trading order, to have the kjisakamow or sakamow to address the
assembled people about contentious issues, and to have the putu's read the
ulnapskoq or symbolic records of their alliances.
At these governance meetings, as well as the local or district meeting,
the Mawio 'mi reunited the clans, eliminated lingering conflict, discussed
and problem solved important issues, and regulated the harvesting
74. For a pre-contact legal history, see Grand Chief Donald Marshall Sr., Grand Captain Alexander
Denny, and Putus Simon Marshall, "The Covenant Chain." in Boyce Richardson, ed., Drumbeat:Anger
and Renewal in Indian Country (Toronto: Sumnerhill Press Ltd, 1989) at 71-104 [Covenant Chain];
Eleanor V. Johnson, Mi"kmaq (M.A. Thesis, Saint Mary's University, 1992), online: <http://mrc.uccb.
ns.ca/eleanor.html>; James (Sa'ke'j) Youngblood Henderson, "First Nations' Legal Inheritances in
Canada: The Mi'kmaq Model."(1996) Manitoba L. J. 23 [Mi'kmaw Model].
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responsibilities under netukulimk. They took inventories of the resources
of the land, and attempted to ensure. that each family had harvesting
responsibilities and sufficient planting and gathering grounds for summer,
fishing stations for spring and autumn, and hunting range for winter. Once
assigned, these properties were secure, and disputes were arbitrated by
the kap'ten individually or in council.75 Also, they conducted ceremonies
and the renewal of existing covenants, visited, discussed, acknowledged
marriages, births and deaths, and shared in spirituality and thanksgiving.
The sovereign authority of Mi'kmaq governance is and always has
been spiritual, persuasive, and noncoercive. It was developed to animate
a discussion about the significant issues facing the Mi'kmaq and to seek a
strategy for resolving the issues. It did not have power or armies to enforce
its strategies. Rather, the continuity and authority of the Mawio'mi exists
in the shared language, knowledge, and traditions, in a common bond-a
comprehensive vision that transcends temporary interests. This bond arises
naturally from the fate of being born into a munijinik (family), a wikamow
(community), a mi "kma'ki (territory), and Lnu (People of the Nation).
This'existing pre-contact sovereignty of the Mawio'mi was recognized
in the 161 Os by the Jesuitical emissaries of the Holy See who first described
it to Euro-Christians and labeled it the "Grand Council". The Jesuit priests
described the division of the Mi'kmaq "commonwealth", "nation", or
"polity" as seven, large, geographical districts under the direction of
one Council, and its affiliation with other peoples and autochthonous
States in the relationship of confederation the people called Nikmamen,
and recorded as "lacamanen" or "ricamenen". 76 Beginning in 1610,
kjisakamow Membertou, by his baptism and agreement, associated the
Mawio'mi with the Holy See under what is known as the sacred pledge
of friendship and alliance, covenant, or concordat in Catholic traditions,
i.e. "what was agreed upon". In Mi'kmaw legal traditions it was called a
teplutakn, or treaty. In accordance with Mi'kmaw legal traditions, over the
next few decades each district, family, and individual consensually ratified
the alliance. 77 After the alliance with the Holy See, which mediated the

75. Mi'kmaq Tradition, supra note 55 at I.
76. Rueben Gold Thwaites, The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents (Cleveland: Burrows
Brothers Company) vol. 3 st 89-91, 101 [Jesuit Relations].
77. James (Sa'ke'j) Youngblood Henderson, The Mikmaw Concordat (Halifax: Fernwood Press,
1997).
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relations of the French King and subjects,"8 the traditional sakamoq were
renamed as kep'tens ("captains") to show the people the good path and to
sit with the whole Mawio 'mi as the government of all the Mi'kmaq. The
relationship was extended to their relatives in other Algonquian-speaking
confederacies, regenerating the Great Council of Fire or Putuswagn.7 9
Similarly, the officers of the imperial British Crown, who arrived in
Mi'kmaq territory between 1625 and 1794, gave the name "Mickmack
Nation" to the Mawio'mi federated chiefs and kep'ten.8 ° The Crown
formed treaties of peace, friendship, and protection with the Mi'kmaq
and referred to these treaties as the covenant chain. 8' By 1760, the British
Crown officers began to comprehend the entire structure and governance
of the Mi'kmaw Nation.8 2 The various treaties followed the legal traditions
of the Mi'kmaw, were ratified by the Crown with the central Treaties of
.1726 and 1752 and were consensually ratified by each district or family
delegate. The Mawio'mi refers to this as the tesqunatek, the treaty order,

78. In 1638, Father Paul Lejeune gives an account of the son of lwanchou [Wanju or Juan Chou], the
Mi'kmaq kep'ten of the Kepe'keweq district of Mi'kmaki around the Bay of Gasp6, went to France
in the name of the Mi'kmaw Nation, and was said to have been very well received by the French
sovereign, at whose feet he laid his Crown of Porcelein beads, Jesuit Relations, supra note 75, vol. 15 at
223, 225. This is confirmed by Ursuline Sister Cdcile de Saint-Croix in Lucien Campeau, Monumenta
Novae Franciae IV. Les grandes 6preuves 1638-1640 (Montreal: Les Editions Bellarmin, 1989) at
747 [Campeau] and Joseph Le Ber, Depart pour le Canada en 1639: Lettre inedite dune Ursuline
(Dieppe, France: Imprimerie de 'La Vigie de Dieppe', 1939) at 30 and Father Nicolas Gondouin, a
missionary at Miscou who accompanied the Mi'kmaw to France (Campeau, ibid. at 747, n. 13; Jesuit
Relations, ibid. vol. 71 at 142-143).
79. F.G. Speck, "The Eastern Algonkian Wabanaki Confederacy" (1915) 17:3 American
Anthropologist at 492.
80. T. Akins, ed., Selections from the Public Documents of the Province of Nova Scotia (Halifax:
Annand, 1869) at 671 [PDNS].
81. Covenant Chain, supra note 74. In R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R 1025 at 1038 [Sioui] ("At the
time with which we are concerned relations with Indian tribes [1760] fell somewhere between the
kind of relations conducted between sovereign states and the relations that such states had with their
own citizens") and at 1053-55 ("[w]e can conclude from the historical doument that both Great Britain
and France felt that the Indian nations had sufficient independence and played a large enough role in
North America for it to be good policy to maintain relations with them very close to those maintained
between sovereign nations... Indian nations were regarded in their relations with European nations
which occupied North America as independent nations.")
82. "Indians in Acadie. A.D. 1760. Extract of a Letter from Col. Fry to His Excellency the Governor
of Nova Scotia, Dated, Fort Cumberland, Chignecto, 7 March 1760," Annual Register, 1760:98;
London Magazine 1760:377; Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society (1809) Vol. X: 115116.
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or in the English language the Mi'kmaw compact or treaty federalism.83
The peace treaties left Aboriginal sovereignty, title, and rights with the
Mawio'mi. Thy created some settlements under British law, established
-trade relations, created processes to resolve disputes about thL separate
peoples, and renewed the treaty relationship.
In general, the Court has ignored the sovereignty and governance
structure of the Mawio'mi. In Marshall 2, it has narrowly characterized
the existing treaties as "local" and assumed without any evidence of
Mi'kmaw law and governance that these treaties were "not made for the
benefit of the Mi'kmaq population as a whole."84 However, the Court has
noted that the imperial Crown wanted to consolidate the treaties into a
comprehensive and all-inclusive treaty at a later date, but assumed it never
happened.85 This may be a Crown's perspective, but it is not a shared
understanding of the Mawio'mi. The Mawio'mi assert the core treaty is
1725-26 with the rest of the treaties ratifying or renewals of this treaty
apply to all Mi'kmaq according to Mi'kmaq law. This treaty relationship
and framework has never been formally rejected by either the imperial
Crown or the Mawio'mi.
Recently, the Court has noted that the controlling principle of
aboriginal and treaty rights in the patriated constitution of Canada is
Aboriginal sovereignty.8 6 Chief Justice McLachlin articulated this
underlying principle: "Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal
sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal

83. James Youngblood Henderson, 1.P.C., Treaty Rights in the Constitution ofCanada (Scarborough
ON: Thompson Carswell, 2007) [Treaty Rights]; Mark D. Walters, "Brightening the Covenant Chain:
Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in Law and History after Marshall" (2001) 24 Dalhousie L.J. 75. In the
imperial law, the treaties with Aboriginal nations are empowered by the imperial act of state doctrine
as well as constitutional supremacy. The imperial act of state doctrine states that the acquisition of
territory by a sovereign state for the first time is an act of state which cannot be challenged, controlled
or interfered with by the courts or the state, Mabo v.Queensland [No. 2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1,[1992]
5 C.N.L.R. I at para. 26 [Mabo].
84. R. v.Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 2 at para. 17 [Marshall 2]; Simon, supra note 9 at 407-08
(discussing s.88 of the Indian Act). The Court in Marshall, supra note 15 at para. 5 and 26, did not
refer to "local" but only to "identical" terms or "separate but similar" treaties.
85. Ibid.
86. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 at para. 20 [Haida
Nation]. In Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 17 at paras. 48-54 the Court referred to the
implicit unwritten norms in the written constitution of Canada as "underlying principles".
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rights guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.87 In this
sense, Aboriginal sovereignty is the foundation for the Aboriginal peoples'
legal traditions, heritage, treaties and rights.
In Van derPeet, the Court began to explain why the diverse Aboriginal
confederacies, nations, tribes, peoples, societies, cultures, communities,
and families exist in imperial law, and why they were recognized and
affirmed as holding aboriginal rights in the common law and s. 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982:
because of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America,
aboriginal peoples were already here, living in communities on the land,
and participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries.
It is this fact, and this fact above all others, which separates aboriginal
peoples from all other minority groups in Canadian society and which
mandates their special legal, and now constitutional, status.88
This simple fact is more than historical description; it is a fact or
premise that creates the ultimate constitutional principle of pre-existing
sovereignty, title, and rights of the Mawio'mi.
In its past decisions since patriation of the constitution, the Court
has referred to Aboriginal sovereignty in many ways. It has used the

87. Ibid. at para. 20. Mi'kmaw sovereignty was implied in the analysis of the 1752 Treaty in the
Simon case, supranote 9 at 399 when the Court unanimously rejected the Nova Scotia Crown invoking
a 1929 decision of Acting Judge Patterson [R. v. Syliboy, supra note 9] that held the Mi'kmaq Indians
were never regarded as an independent power because they were "uncivilized peoples or savages" and
"the savages' rights of sovereignty even of ownership were never recognized". Chief Justice Dickson
observed: "It should be noted that the language used by Patterson J., illustrated in this passage,
reflects the biases and prejudices of another era in history. Such language is no longer acceptable in
Canadian law and indeed is inconsistent with a growing sensitivity to native rights in Canada." Thus,
the Mi'kmaw sovereignty and ownership was recognized in the imperial treaties. See also, Sioui,
supranote 81 at 1055. ("The British Crown recognized that the Indians had certain ownership rights
over their land ...[and] allowed them autonomy in their internal affairs, intervening in this area as
little as possible.")
88. Van der Peel, supra note 50 at para. 30; see also para. 20 (The Court cannot ignore the necessary
specificity which comes from granting special constitutional protection to one part of Canadian society)
and para. 27 (what the court must do is explain the rationale and foundation of the recognition and
affirmation of the special rights of aboriginal peoples); Sappier-Gray,supra note 21 at para. 42. See
also R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R.393 at para. 35 [Sundown] ("Aboriginal and treaty rights... are the
right of aboriginal people in common with other aboriginal people to participate in certain practices
traditionally engaged in by particular aboriginal nations in particular territories."). The immigrants to
Canada also have parts of their cultural heritage protected in s. 27 of the CanadianCharterof Rights
and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982, and in
multicultural acts [Charter].
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Eurocentric human science concepts of "nationality",89 "political
structures", "societies", "social organization", and "culture" 90 to discuss
pre-existing Aboriginal "confederacies", "nations", and "tribes", like
the Mawio'mi. It has reoriented the constitutional relationship between
Aboriginal sovereignty and the power of the Crown by generating the
doctrine of the honour of the Crown9' and constitutional, sui generis (one
of a kind) fiduciary obligations. 92 These concepts are vital to reorient
the Crown and its governments to Aboriginal sovereignty in a patriated
constitutional order.93 In contrast to the concept of good governance in

the colonial constitutional order, the Court's decisions on aboriginal and
treaty rights have generated a new theory of honourable governance as a
constitutional mechanism between the representative of the Crown and
Aboriginal peoples.94 It is a part of the deepening of our understanding of

the innovative modalities of shared sovereignty. 95
Based on these innovative interpretations of constitutional law and the
use of oral traditions and languages, the Court has revealed how Aboriginal
knowledge operated to affirm and protect Aboriginal sovereignty in the
patriated constitutional framework of Canada. The Aboriginal sovereignty
89. Sioui, supra note 81 at 1053, 1056; Van der Peet, supra note 50 at paras. 30 and 107; R. v. Cdt6,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 at para. 48 [Ct ]; Delgamuukw, supra note 30 at para. 115; and Sundown, ibid.
at para. 35. See Harold Cardinal and W. Hildebrand, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our dream is that
our peoples will one day be clearly recognized as nations (Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press,
2000); RCAP Report, supra note 1, vol. 2 (3) (Restructuring the Relationship, Governance), at 177
- 84 (Aboriginal nation as the vehicle for self-determination). It should be remembered that at the time
of the treaties with First Nations, in "the British common law traditions or constitutional theory of the
commonwealth no theory of the state or the nation exists", P. Cobbett, "'The Crown' as Representing
'the State' (1903) 1Commonwealth L. Rev. 23 [The Crown] at 30.
90. Delgamuukw, ibid. at para. 41 (aboriginal title arises out of the prior social organization and
distinctive cultures of Aboriginal peoples on that land); Van der Peet, ibid. at para. 74 (aboriginal rights
arise from the prior social organization and distinctive cultures of aboriginal peoples on a land); Cdtj,
ibid. at para. 41 ("distinctive culture" of the Algonquin people); Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R.
911 [Mitchell] at para. 9 ("Long before Europeans explored and settled North America, aboriginal
peoples were occupying and using most of this vast expanse of land in organized, distinctive societies
with their own social and political structures.")
91. Sparrow, supra note II at 1108; Marshall, supra note 15 at para. 16 and 78, Mitchell, ibid. at
para. 9; Haida Nation, supra note 86 at paras. 16-19,27, and 58-59; Mikisew Cree First Nation, [2005]
3 S.C.R.388 at paras. 33, 51, 54 and 57 [Mikisew Cree Nation]; B. Slattery, "Aboriginal Rights and
the Honour of the Crown" (2005) 29 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 434.
92. Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 382 [Guerin]; Sparrow, ibid. at 1108; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3
S.C.R. 101 at paras. 54-55 [Adams]; Blueberry River Indian Band v Canada, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344.
93. Haida Nation, supra note 86 at para. 20.
94. Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown, supra note 83; David M. Amot, "The Honour
of the Crown" (1996) 60 Sask. L. Rev. 339. For a discussion of the concept of Indigenous governance
in the Australian context, see Alexander Reilly, "A Constitutional Framework for Indigenous
Governance" (2006) 28 Sydney L. Rev. 403 at 405-411.
95. June McCue, "New Modalities of Sovereignty: An Indigenous Perspective" (2007) 2 Intercultural
Human Rights L. Rev. 19; B. Slattery, "Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims" (1991) 29
Osgoode Hall L.J. I.
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of the Mawio'omi has always operated by its own force derived from
Mi'kmaw knowledge, languages, and legal traditions. It is not about
absolute power, but the subtle art of generating and sustaining relationships.
It is a distinct vision about the way humans lived together and behaved
in a kinship and an ecosystem, a distinct tradition of philosophies and
humanities. It is a distinct philosophy ofjustice and legal traditions based
on spiritual and ecological understandings and linguistic conventions
that are interconnected. It is an implicit, inherent, dramatic, epistemic,
unwritten, and living concept.
The sovereignty of the Mawio'mi separates them from all other
groups and peoples who migrated to Atlantic Canada. 6 It generates a
distinct theory of equality of law behind holders of constitutional authority
under constitutional supremacy. 97 These judicial interpretative principles
rely upon and animate the latent Aboriginal peoples' knowledge and
heritage.98 Aboriginal knowledge and legal traditions provide the content
to Aboriginal sovereignty, title, and rights as well as the substantive,
evidentiary, and procedural processes of aboriginal and treaty rights. 99
They clarify the underlying jurisprudential framework' 00 of Aboriginal
peoples' rights. Aboriginal sovereignty and its implicit principlesin s. 35
animate a resourceful constitutional analysis that searches for underlying
principles of jurisprudence, which is an exceptional and extraordinary
transformation in Canadian scholarship and law. It provides the Canadian
scholarly and legal profession with a foundation for developing a sui
generis constitutional analysis or method, perhaps based on Aboriginal
languages, through which the imported jurisprudences can be reconciled
with Aboriginal jurisprudence.
The Court has continually affirmed that the constitutional rights of
Aboriginal peoples are communal or group rights, rather than individualized
ones.1°1 This has maintained Aboriginal sovereignty. The source of the
sovereignty and. rights exists in Mi'kmaw and Maliseet knowledge,
96. Van der Peet, supra note 50 at 30.
97. Supra note 13 at s. 52(l). The general principle of treating like cases alike is central to the
concept of equality in law, Concept of Law, supra note 89, ch. 8. It is characterized as a matter of
justice, coherence, integrity or fairness, and equality. Its corresponding principle, to treat distinct cases
differently, is also a matter of equality.
98. These constitutional principles were found by the Court in the express and implied acts of
imperial treaties, law and judicial interpretation. See Treaty Rights, supra note 83 at c.1-5.
99. Van der Peet, supra note 50 at para. 29 ("The pre-existence of aboriginal rights is relevant to the
analysis of s. 35(l) because it ...
sheds light on the reasons for protecting those rights").
100. The Court recognized the jurisprudential framework for analyzing Aboriginal rights embedded
in s. 35(l) in Sparrow, supra note I I at 1091-lIl1; defining, refining, and clarifying aboriginal rights
in Van der Peet, ibid, and explained it further in Delgamuukw, supra note 30.
101. Delgamuukw, ibid. at para. 115; Sappier-Gray, supra note 21 at para. 26.

336 The Dalhousie Law Journal

language, and legal traditions; they are rededicated, preserved, and
enhanced in the constitution by the existing aboriginal and treaty rights." 2
These ancient communal rights have to be exercised by members of the
Mi'kmaw and Maliseet community consistent with pre-contact Aboriginal
sovereignty or its reconciliation in the treaties with the Crown, rather
than through Indian Act entities or status, race, or theories of abstract
individualism.
The communal nattire of the Mawio'mi sovereignty and constitutional
rights created distinctive legal traditions and netukulimk responsibilities. 03
These legal responsibilities are defined within the Mi'kmaw language
and are 'the context for understanding treaties and their agreements.
Understanding and respecting Mi'kmaw law requires Mi'kmaq and courts
to move back to understanding the netukulimk. These legal responsibilities
are needed now to rebuild our families, our culture, the language, our
clans,and our nation. These indigenous laws could go a long way toward
protecting ecological resources from exploitations from all groups, and
would once again make the Mi'kmaq the guardians of the resource given
by the Life Giver as explained in the creation stories and other oral
traditions.

102. Sappier-Gray, supra note 21 at paras. 21 and 34; R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207 at para.
13. (The inclusion of the Metis in s. 35 is based on a commitment to recognizing the Mdtis and
enhancing their survival as distinctive communities. The purpose and promise of s. 35 with respect
to Metis Aboriginal rights is to protect practices that are historically important features of distinctive
communities and that persist in the present day as integral elements of Mtis culture. The purpose
and promise of s. 35 with respect to M6tis Aboriginal rights is to protect practices that are historically
important features of distinctive communities and that persist in the present day as integral elements
of M~tis culture.")
103. James [Sa'ke'j] Youngblood Henderson, "Aboriginal Jurisprudence and Rights" in K. Wilkens,
ed., Advancing Aboriginal Claims: Visions/ Strategies/Directions(Saskatoon: Purich, 2004).
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IV. Mi "kmawterritory
The Court in Sappier-Graywas not asked to deal with a claim of aboriginal
title."° The aboriginal right claim to harvest wood was nonetheless site
specific. It concerned the exercise of an aboriginal right to traditionally
harvest the forest by Gray within the Sigenigteoagdistrict of the Mawio'mi
(most of modem day New Brunswick). In its analysis the Supreme Court
of Canada was not careful to distinguish between the description of precontact Mikmaq/Maliseet territory and current Indian Act reserves. In its
analysis, the Court jumped from pre-contact practices to contemporary
political designations without acknowledging the disruption caused by the
federal crown's exercise of authority under the Indian Act in the creation
of reserves.
The Court in Sappier-Grayheld that no clear.legal authority from the
imperial Crown to New Brunswick existed to extinguish aboriginal rights
of the Mawio'mi. 05 The Court analyzed a site-specific right.based on the
communal territory, a necessary geographical element of an aboriginal
right. The Crown conceded in the case of Sappier and Polchies that the
wood was gathered within the traditional Maliseet territory 10 6 and the
evidence established in the case of Gray that the harvesting of trees
occurred within Crown lands traditionally used by the Mi'kmaq.' °7 The
Court concluded that the practice of harvesting wood for domestic uses
was integral to the pre-contact distinctive culture of both the Maliseet

104. Sappier-Gray, supra note 21 at paras. 50-53; Delgamuukw, supra note 30 at paras. 111-112
(Aboriginal title is a sui generis right in land and, as such, is more than the right to engage in specific
activities which may be themselves Aboriginal rights) and paras. 137-39 (..."aboriginal title is
"simply one manifestation of a broader-based conception of aboriginal rights" ... it is distinct from
other aboriginal rights ... some aboriginal groups may be unable to make out a claim to title, but will
nevertheless possess aboriginal rights that are recognized and affirmed by s.35(l)"); and Van der
Peet, supra note 50 at para. 74 (aboriginal rights and aboriginal title are related concepts, aboriginal
title being a sub-category of aboriginal rights which deals solely with claims of rights to land); R.
v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 at paras. 25-26 [Adams] and in the companion decision, C6t6, supra
note 91 at para. 38 (Court considered and rejected the proposition that claims to Aboriginal rights
must be inherently grounded in an underlying claim to Aboriginal title; it held aboriginal rights may
exist independently of aboriginal title; aboriginal title is simply one distinct manifestation or species
of aboriginal rights, which was recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1)). See Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal
Title and Aboriginal Rights: What's the connection" (1997-98) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 117; John P. McEvoy,
"Aboriginal Activities and Aboriginal Rights: A Comment on R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray" (2007) 6:2
Indigenous L. J. I [AboriginalActivities].
105. Sappier-Gray,ibid.at para. 58.
106. Ibid. at para. 52.
3
107. Ibid. at par. 53. In 2002, N.B. had allocated 5073 m for commercial logging to the Mi'kmaq
on-reserve at Pabineau Indian Reserve, New Brunswick Department of Natural Resources, Annual
Report 2005-2006 (Fredericton: Department of Natural Resources, 2006) at 69.
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and Mi'kmaq peoples.' It held that Gray possessed an aboriginal right
to harvest wood for domestic uses on Crown lands traditionally used for
that purpose by members of the Pabineau First Nation and that Sappier
and Polchies possessed an aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic
uses that is necessarily limited to Crown lands traditionally harvested
by members of the Woodstock First Nation. 10 9 Justice Bastarache
characterized this aboriginal right as limited to the exercise of this right in
modem Maliseet and Mi'kmaw communities on the Indian Act reserves
without any commercial dimension.' 10 Justice Binnie disagreed with this
limitation; he noted that the exercise of the aboriginal rights by trade,
barter or sale within the reserve or other local Aboriginal community
would reflect a more efficient use of human resources."' But he agreed
with Justice Bastarache that any trade, barter or sale of the aboriginal rights
to wood outside a reserve or other local Aboriginal community where the
person lives would represent a commercial activity outside the scope of
the aboriginal right established in this case.2
The Court interpreted these site-specific rights as applying in the
traditional territory attached to Crown lands around a federal Indian Act

108. Ibid. at paras. 42-47 and 72. He used the word communities in para. 42-47, but in para. 72
referring to the members of Woodstock First Nation, Justice Binnie clarified it applied to reserves.
109. Ibid. at paras. 51, 52, and 72. The Court mentioned the members of the Pabineau First Nation
in para. 72. The Court did not mention the case of R. v. Thomas Peter Paul (1996), 182 N.B.R. (2d)
270 (Prov. Ct.) held that another Mi'kmaw resident of Pabineau Indian Reserve had right to harvest
timber under the Treaties of 1725 ratified in 1726. These treaties were not raised by the parties before
the trial court as evidence, but arose from the trial court's research in law and history pursuant to the
concept of judicial notice see Sioui, supra note 81 at 1050. The trial court judge stated: "It is not a
right restricted to personal use but a full blown right of beneficial ownership and possession in keeping
with the concept of this is our land - that is your land." On appeal, the Queen's Bench court recognized
the right to harvest timber as an incident to existing Aboriginal title of Mi'kmaq to Crown lands, 193
N.B.R. 2d 321 (Q.B.). The Court of Appeal reversed on both points and entered a conviction because
of the "uncertainty" created by the lower court decisions, (1998), 196 N.B.R. ( 2n)" 292 (C.A.); leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court denied, see (1998) N.B. R. (2d) 400. Because of the uncertainty, in 1998,
the N.B. Crown entered into an interim commercial harvesting agreement on Crown land with the
Maliseet and Mi'kmaq on-reserve. The interim agreement was substituted by a five-year agreement
(2002-2007) without prejudice to the constitutional rights of either party. The 2005-06 allocation for
the Maliseet First Nation at Woodstock was 13, 909 m 3 and the Mi'kmaw First Nation at Pabineau
was allocated 5073 m 3 ,N.B. Department of Natural Resources, supra note 177 at 69. See Aboriginal
Activities, supra note 108 at 3-4. In contrast to the agreement, it is disconcerting to see the Crown
prosecute Sappier, Polchies, and Gray for the harvesting of wood for personal use.
110. Sappier-Gray,supra note 21 at para. 25.
Ill. Ibid. atpara. 74.
112. Ibid.
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reserve,1 3 rather than the district in unceded territory of the Mawio'mi.
The Court's substitution of a narrow definition of traditional territory by
reference to federal law for the constitutional framework of s. 35 and s. 52(1)
that aboriginal rights has constructed is disconcerting. Such unexplained
substitution confuses constitutional supremacy with federal law and policy
based on colonial assumptions, when they are different legal jurisdictions.
While the judicial test for aboriginal and treaty rights reaches back in
history to pre-contact, the implementation of constitutional rights in the
present day has to confront the disconnection between constitutional rights
of the Mawio'mi with the colonial and neocolonial federal administration
of Indians. The courts have begun to displace the colonial discourse about
Aboriginal sovereignty, tenure, law, and rights,but neither the federal nor
the provincial Crown has decolonized the administration of Indians. The
Crown's avoidance of constitutional supremacy exacerbates the existing
disconnect and inconsistency.
While the practice of aboriginal and treaty rights can be modernized,
the Aboriginal sovereignty and territory that is the constitutional source
of the rights cannot be substituted by federally or provincially created
entities, such as the Indian Act bands or individual registered Indians. This
is especially so when a continuing traditional sovereign and government,
like the Mawio'mi, still exists. In Sappier-Graythe substitution of Indian
Act bands and references to the Indian Act reserve system as the center for
determining where one can exercise territorial harvesting rights and where
they can use the wood, rather than reliance on the communal rights of
the Mawio'mi districts under aboriginal title, rights or treaties, displaces.
the constitutional framework with federal and provincial law and policy.
This approach gave little guidance on the constitutional geographic scope
of the aboriginal right or traditional territory. The Court has rejected the
displacement of the constitutional framework by federal law and policy
approach stating that s. 35 did not constitutionalize federal law and policy,
rather it constitutionalized pre-existing aboriginal and treaty rights which
are held by Aboriginal peoples not the Crowns.1 4 It stated that historical
113. Ibid at paras. 25 and 74. This is a similar approach that developed in the Court's discussion in
Marshall2, supra note 84 at para. i7, of the local community to which the accused belongs under
the IndianAct is a proper beneficiary of a communal treaty right. The Mawio'mi took the view that
the treaty beneficiaries extended to every member of the Mi'kmaq Nation, and the Indian Act was
irrelevant.
114. Sparrow, supranote II at 1101 ("Historical policy on the part of the Crown can neither extinguish
the existing aboriginal right without clear intention nor, in itself, delineate that right. The nature of
government regulations cannot be determinative of the content and scope of an existing aboriginal
right. Government policy can, however, regulate the exercise of that right but such regulation must be
in keeping with s. 35(1).")
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policy on the part of the Crown could neither extinguish an existing
aboriginal right without clear intention nor, in itself, delineate that right." 5
The Court's continued use of the federal Indian Act in constitutional rights
litigation is inconsistent with constitutional supremacy and Mawio'mi
rights, and as such the Indian Act should not have any place, force or effect
6
in cases dealing with the context of s. 35 rights."
These judicial inconsistencies, intentional or not, reveal the need
for constitutional reconciliation to address these constitutional issues in
a comprehensive manner. 1 7 The fragmentary case-by-case analysis of
regulatory offences cannot capture the comprehensive issues. The Court
has noted that negotiation and reconciliations under its constitutional
framework is its preferred option, rather than litigation."' The Crown has
ignored the Court's option for constitutional reconciliation, it continues to
litigate against Mi'kmaq struggling to survive and rejects constitutional
reconciliation for policy driven processes.
V. Long overdue constitutionalreconciliation
In 1996, Governor General Romeo LeBlanc stated:
We owe the Aboriginal peoples a debt that is four centuries old. It is their
turn to become full partners in developing an even greater Canada. And
the reconciliation required may be less a matter of legal texts than of
attitudes of the heart." 9
Thej udiciary has attempted to create a constitutional framework of the legal
reconciliation in s. 35 jurisprudence, but the general change of attitude by
the Crown or elected government has not occurred. It seems that they are
still struggling to justify and conceal the wrong their ancestors perpetuated
against the Mawio'mi. 2 0 The Court has rejected the past Crown's policy of
115. Ibid.
116. For a discussion of constitutional supremacy, see Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 17 at
paras. 70-78. Section 52(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, supra note 13 ("The Constitution of Canada
is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution
is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect"); Quebec Secession Reference, supra note
17 at para. 72.
117. While Mi'kmaq have little choice in their prosecution by the Crown, Justice LeBel in MarshallBernard, supra note 15 at para. 142, expressed that summary convention courts are not the appropriate
venue for aboriginal and treaty tenure litigation. The poverty ofMi'kmaq do not give them a choice of
sustaining a civil case against either the federal or provincial Crown.
118. Sparrow, supra note II at 1105; Delgamuukw, supra note 30 at para. 186 and 207; Marshall 2,
supra note 84 at para. 22.
119. Speech on the occasion of the presentation of the 1996 Native Role Models, February 23, 1996.
120. The Crown's attitude reminds me of the statement of J.M. Coetzee, a recipient of the Nobel
Prize for literature: "Empire dooms itself to live in history and plot against history. One thought alone
preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era" in
Waiting for the Barbarians (New York: Penguin, 1980) at 133.
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deliberate avoidance or abeyance of the constitutional rights of Aboriginal
peoples and related misinterpretations that created the impoverished
concept of its duty and rights. It has noted the past and present multitude
of smaller grievances of Aboriginal people created by the indifference of
some government officials to Aboriginal peoples' concerns about their
rights.'2 ' This avoidance and indifference has represented the entire Crown
policy toward the Mawio'mi. The Crowns have not confronted the need for
constitutional reconciliations for the aboriginal or treaty rights in patriated
Canada; instead they continue to rely on a costly strategy of case-bycase litigation with impoverished Mi'kmaw communities that fragments
the unity of the aboriginal and treaty rights of the Mawio'mi, and on
fragmentary and specific policy initiatives by the Crown that expressly
avoid the constitutional rights of the Mawio'mi and Mi'kmaq.
The Crown has not lived up to its promise of treaty reconciliation. The
Court has stated that the "subtext of the Mi'kmaq treaties was reconciliation
and mutual advantage"' 22 The various Crowns have not sought to restore
the constitutional rights of the Mawio'mi, whose law and policy it had
continually attempted to erode. 23 The Crown's policies are not consistent
with the Court's view of constitutional rights and the obligations of the
Crown. The Crowns have continued to discriminate systemically against
treaty rights of the Mawi'omi, relying on non-binding negotiations
based on policy with its federally funded bands and organizations. These
organizations and leaders have the best of intentions given the limitations
of the Indian Act and its bureaucracy, but they seem to be struggling to
make meaningful progress on specific issues.
Since 1977, the Mawio'mi, in conjunction "with various Mi'kmaw
organizations, has submitted comprehensive land claims and specific
treaty-based land claims to the federal Crown.2 4 Federal policy, rather
than constitutional law or a legal position, has generated the structure of

121. Mikisew Cree Nation, supra note 95 at para. 1.
122. Marshall,supra note 15 at para. 3.
123. RCAP Report, supra note 1, vol. 1 at 274-310.
124. Canada, Statement made by the Honourable Jean Chretien, Minister of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development on Claims of Indian and Inuit People, August 8, 1973. The comprehensive
claims Policy occurred largely in response to the Court's decision in Calder v. Attorney-General of
British Columbia, [ 1973] S.C.R. 313, in which some judges recognized land rights based on-Aboriginal
title. The policy divides claims into the two broad categories of comprehensive and specific claims.
Comprehensive claims, include claims of a different nature in Atlantic Canada, which the Mawio'mi
and the Union of Nova Scotia Indians submitted are based on the assertion of continuing title to land
and resources. Special claims involve violation of treaty rights and lawful obligations.
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the claims and these policies have changed over time, 25 but the Mawio'mi
claims have not been resolved. 21 6 Nonetheless, the submission of the various
land claims of the Mawio'mi to the federal Crown in the constitutional
framework establishes the knowledge of the potential existence of an
aboriginal and treaty tenure and rights and the Crown's duty of fair dealing
27

and reconciliation.1

The federal and provincial Crowns have resisted implementing the
aboriginal and treaty rights that have been adjudicated and affirmed.' 2 The
implementation must still be worked out by consultation with the Mawio'mi
and Mi'kmaq. It is 'a required constitutional process under the honour of
the Crown, not a discretionary power.'29 The Court has established the
Crown's duty of honourable dealings with communal rights under s. 35(1).
It has stated that the honour of the Crown is involved in the process of
32
31
treaty making. 13 It infuses every treaty,' governs treaty interpretations
and treaty application. 3 3 It assumes that the Crown intends to fulfill its
promises and obligations,'34 requires courts and administrators to interpret
the treaties in a manner that maintains the honour of the crown, 135 and
infuses the performance of every treaty obligation.'3 6 It is part of

125. Sparrow, supra note 11 at 1104-5. In 1986 this policy was reformed based on s. 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 13, which recognized that Aboriginal and treaty rights presently
exist or may be acquired via land claim agreements and the Coolican Report, Living Treaties: Lasting
Agreements, A Report of the Task Force to Review Comprehensive Claims Policy, (Ottawa: Indian
and Northern Affairs, 1986) produced as a result of extensive consultation with Aboriginal and other
groups.
126. James (Sa'ke'j) Youngblood Henderson and Adrian Tanner, "Aboriginal Land Rights in the
Atlantic Provinces" in Ken Coates, ed., Aboriginal Land Claims in Canada (Toronto: Copp Clark
Pitman, 1992) at 131. See also, Dummer's Treaty, supra note 128.
127. Haida Nation, supranote 86 at paras. 26-35.
128. Treaty Rights, supranote 83 at c. 41; Office of the Treaty Commissioner, Treaty Implementation:
Fulfilling the Covenant (Saskatoon: Office of the Treaty Commissioner, 2007.)
129. Marshall,supranote 15 at paras. 63-64 ("To paraphrase Adams, at para. 51, under the applicable
regulatory regime, the appellant's exercise of his treaty right to fish and trade for sustenance
was exercisable only at the absolute discretion of the Minister. Mi'kmaq treaty rights were not
accommodated in the Regulations because, presumably, the Crown's position was, and continues
to be, that no such treaty rights existed. In the circumstances, the purported regulatory prohibitions
against fishing without a licence (Maritime Provinces Fishery Regulations, s. 4(I)(a)) and of selling
eels without a licence (Fishery (General) Regulations, s. 35(2)) do primafacie infringe the appellant's
treaty rights under the Treaties of 1760-61 and are inoperative against the appellant unless justified
under the Badger test."
130. Haida Nation, supra note 86 at para 19.
131. Ibid. and Mikisew Cree Nation, supra note 95 at para. 33.
132. Haida Nation, ibid. at para. 19:
133. Ibid. at para. 19; Mikisew Cree Nation, supra note 95 at para. 33.
134. R. v. Badger, [1996] I S.C.R. 771 at para. 52.
135. R. v. Taylor and Williams, [1981] 3 C.N.L.R. 114 (Ont. C.A.) at 123.
136. Mikisew Cree Nation, supra note 95 at para. 54.
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"managing change" and "managing" the relationship between the Crown
37
and constitutional rights of Aboriginal peoples.
In a fair and honourable treaty implementation process, the proper
focus is on the issue of implementing the original treaties that harmonized
pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with the assumption of Crowns, both
federally and provincially. The imperial treaties with the Mawio'mi
kep'tens and chiefs did not end the sovereignty of the Mawio'mi or the
assumptions of the Crown. The assumptions of the Crown continue to
avoid the recognition and implementation of these imperial treaties and
communal rights -aboriginal and treaty rights- of the Mawio'mi in a
constitutional framework. The Mawio'mi also continues to resist being
led by federal or provincial Crown or bureaucracies. The Mawio'mi has
proven its strength in its endurance and in its leadership of the people
in traditional governance and foundations. It has animated and facilitated
aboriginal rights based on pre-contact law and treaty rights based on
their consensual agreement with the imperial Crown. The Mawio'mi has
comprehended that its sovereignty is led from its Creation story, its legal
traditions and from within the Mi'kmaw, not by the Crown, settlers, or
bureaucrats whose interests and systems approaches are not only foreign.
but unilaterally generate change by political desire or whim.
Over these tumultuous centuries, the Mawio'mi in cooperation with
the organization and bands of Mi'kmaq has provided the leadership in
building the source and natural resources of treaties and aboriginal rights,
and international human rights. Its connections through the centuries to
the entire nation, rather than parts of it, has provided the generations with
Mi'kmaw language, values and concepts of laws. Since 1985, when the
Court recognized the aboriginal and treaty rights of the Mi'kmaq, the
courts, rather than the government and bureaucracy, have created the most
positive changes occurring in Mi'kmaw communities. The Crown or its
bureaucracy have not responded to these judicial decisions. They continue
to try to assimilate constitutional rights into federal or provincial laws.
They have done little to eliminate the relentless Third World poverty,
lifestyles, and racism in which Mi'kmaq have to struggle to survive and
animate their talents and competencies.
The constitutional reconciliation of aboriginal rights is also needed for
the Mawio'mi. The treaties represent only the issues that the Mawio'mi
and the chiefs could reach agreement on with the imperial Crown. In
the absence of a specific treaty right, on those issues on which no mutual
agreement was made, -the reserved aboriginal rights of the Mawio'mi,
137. Ibid. at paras.l and 63.
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a large residual power of Aboriginal sovereignty and tenure, which
both the federal and provincial Crown need to address separately from
implementation of existing treaty rights. These aboriginal rights need to
be constitutionally reconciled with other constitutional powers. This theme
of reconciliation of aboriginal rights pervades the contemporary judicial
decisions on constitutional law and interpretation, but is still avoided by
the federal and provincial Crowns. ,
Constitutional reconciliation is permeated with understanding and
respecting aboriginal rights and the search for a positive, durable, and
living constitutional relationship. As Madam Justice McLachlin (as she
then was), dissenting, explained in the aboriginal rights context, "The
desire for reconciliation, in many cases long overdue, lay behind the
adoption of section 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982."'
The Court has offered different visions of constitutional reconciliation
of aboriginal rights. 3 9 Its concept of constitutional reconciliation is
complex, contextually defined, and sometimes appears to be a development
of different approaches to the constitutional convergence of constitutional
powers and rights. 4 '
The initial concept of constitutional reconciliation was first articulated
in R. v. Sparrow.4 ' In the context of subsistence and ceremonial fishing, the
unanimous Court explained that because aboriginal rights are recognized
and affirmed, but not clearly defined in s. 35, they are not absolute. The
federal government, by virtue of its powers in section 91, continues to
have some legislative powers with respect to Indians and Lands reserved
for Indians in s. 91(24) and fisheries in s. 91(12). However, the Court stated
that these powers are not absolute either, and since 1982, they have been
qualified by s. 35 and s. 52 of the ConstitutionAct. 1982. Thus, federal
power to legislate in respect of Indians and the fisheries must be reconciled
with the federal duty to respect their constitutionally protected rights
under section 35(1).142 According to the Court, the "best" way to achieve
such reconciliation is by reading together the constitutional provisions

138. Van der Peet, supra note 50 at para. 310.
139. Kent McNeil, "Reconciliation and the Supreme Cor*: Two Opposing views of Chief Justice
Lamer and McLachlin" (2003) 2 Indigenous L. J. I; _'tight G. Newman, "Reconciliation: Legal
Conception(s) and Faces of Justice" in John D. -Viyte, Moving TowardJustice: Legal Traditionsand
AboriginalJustice (Saskatoon: Purich, 2007) at 80.
140. Kent McNeil, "Reconciliation and the Supreme Court: Two Opposing views of Chief Justice
Lamer and McLachlin" (2003) 2 Indigenous L. J. 1;Dwight G. Newman, "Reconciliation: Legal
Conception(s) and Faces of Justice" in John D. Whyte, Moving TowardJustice: Legal Traditionsand
AboriginalJustice (Saskatoon: Purich, 2007) at 80.
141. Ibid. at 1109.
142. Ibid.
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and demanding government justification of any legislative measure that
infringes aboriginal rights.
The Court has articulated the interconnected purposes of s. 35(1) that
include: determining the historical rights of Aboriginal peoples and giving
them constitutional force to protect against legislative powers; 41 3precluding
the unilateral extinguishment of Aboriginal peoples' rights;'" assisting
in reconciling the rights and interests that arise from their distinctive
societies with the sovereignty of the Crown; 45 providing Aboriginal
peoples with a solid constitutional base for fair recognition of Aboriginal
rights and negotiations and settlement of Aboriginal claims; 4 6 committing
to recognize, value, protect, and enhance their distinctive cultures;'47 and

143. Sparrow, ibid.at 1110; Delgamuukw supra note 30 at para. 126, notes that "the law ofAboriginal
title does not only seek to determine the historic rights of Aboriginal peoples to land; it also seeks to
afford legal protection to prior occupation in the present-day"; Cdt , supra note 22 at para. 74. ("The
text and purpose of s.35(l) do not distinguish between federal and provincial laws which restrict
aboriginal and treaty rights, and they should both be subject to the same standard of constitutional
scrutiny.")
144. In Delgamuukw, ibid. at paras. 180-181 (The Court concluded that since 1871, provincial
laws of general application did not have the constitutional competence under the division of powers
to extinguish the doctrine of common law Aboriginal rights); Van der Peet, supra note 50 at para.
133 (L'Heureux-Dub J., dissenting on other grounds) and 232 (McLachlin J., dissenting on other
grounds).
145. Van der Peet, ibid. at para. 43 (Aboriginal rights are "the means by which that prior occupation
is reconciled with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over Canadian territory"), para. 44 ("in order to
fulfil the purpose underlying s. 35(1) - i.e., the protection and reconciliation of the interests which
arise from the fact that prior to the arrival of Europeans in North America aboriginal peoples lived
on the land in distinctive societies, with their own practices, customs and traditions") and para. 57
("those distinctive features of aboriginal rights which need to be acknowledged and reconciled with
the sovereignty of the Crown"); and R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [Gladstone] at para. 72 ("the
the reconciliation
recognition of the prior occupation of North America by-aboriginal peoples or ...
of aboriginal prior occupation with the assertion of the sovereignty of the Crown"). In Delgamuukw,
supra note 30 at para. 186, the Court stated that "[u]ltimately, it is through negotiated settlements,
with good faith and give and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of this Court, that we
will achieve what I stated in Van der Peet, supra at para. 31, to be a basic purpose of s.35(1) - 'the
reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown'. Let us
face it, we are all here to stay".
146. Sparrow,supra note II at 1105 ("Section 35(1), at the least, provides a solid constitutional base
upon which subsequent negotiations can take place"); In Van der Peet, ibid McLachlin, J. (as she then
was) dissenting on other grounds at para. 229-232 (s. 35(l) "seeks not only to reconcile these claims
with European settlement and sovereignty but also to reconcile them in a way that provides the basis
for a just and lasting settlement of aboriginal claims consistent with the high standard which the law
imposes on the Crown in its dealings with aboriginal peoples"); Delgamuukw, ibid., at para. 186 ("As
was said in Sparrow, at p. 1105 ... the Crown is under a moral, if not a legal, duty to enter into and
conduct those negotiations in good faith").
147. Powley, supra note 106 at paras. 13, 18.
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sanctioning challenges to social and economic policy objectives embodied
48
in legislation to the extent that aboriginal rights are affected.
The Court has noted that reconciliation will ultimately be achieved
through good faith negotiated agreements between the Crown and
Aboriginal sovereigns. 149 It has emphasized that fair and just reconciliation
will take into account both Aboriginal and common law perspectives and
place equal weight on each. 5 0 It has explained that the promise of rights
recognition, constitutionally protected in s. 35(1), is realized and reconciled
with Aboriginal sovereignty claims through the process of honourable
treaty negotiations leading to just settlements of Aboriginal claims.' 5'
The fundamental objective of the modem law of aboriginal and treaty
rights is the reconciliation of Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal
peoples and their respective claims, interests and ambitions. 52 It is time that
the Crown listen and engage in treaty implementation and constitutional
reconciliation with the Mawio'mi sovereign and communal, constitutional
rights. The jagged case-by-case approach by the Court has provided an
adequate foundation for these constitutional duties.
The concepts of constitutional reconciliation and the honour of the
Crown represent a cornerstone for renewing constitutional approaches for
addressing aboriginal and treaty rights of the Mawio'mi and implementing
these rights. There is now a substantial body of constitutional law and
jurisprudence that provides significant guidance as to how reconciliation
with the Mawio'mi should be achieved in the Canadian constitutional
context. The Court properly views constitutional reconciliation as a political
process involving fair negotiations between holders of constitutional rights
and powers, rather than constituting a final judicial remedy. The goal is a
dynamic and honourable form of government with the Mawio'mi.
The Court conceives reconciliation as a process that flows from the rights
guaranteed by s. 35(1) and the Crown's constitutional duty of honourable
dealing toward the rights of Aboriginal peoples. In the Mi'kmaq context
this requires a reconciliation with the seven districts of the Mawio'mi and
the Crown, rather than with the isolated bands of Mi'kmaw. There has

148. Sparrow, supra note 11 at 1110 (The Court rejected the Crown's argument at 1106-07 that s.
35 was merely of a preambular character not entitled to constitutional protection, instead holding:
"By giving aboriginal rights constitutional status and priority, Parliament and the provinces have
sanctioned challenges to social and economic policy objectives embodied in legislation to the extent
that aboriginal rights are affected. Implicit in this constitutional scheme is the obligation of the
legislature to satisfy the test of justification.")
149. Delgamuukw,supra note 30 at para. 186; Haida Nation, supra note 86 at para. 20.
150. Van der Peet, supra note 50 at paras. 49 and 50; see also Delgamuukw, ibid at para. 81.
151. Haida Nation, supra note 86 at para. 20, see note 8.
152. Mikisew Cree Nation, supra note 95 at para. I.
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to be a national reconciliation with the Mi'kmaq Nation, the holders of
aboriginal and treaty rights, and the bands with the federal and provincial
Crowns. The honour of the Crown requires a Mawio'mi reconciliation,
since it arises from the "Crown's assertion of sovereignty over Aboriginal
peoples and defacto control of land and resources that were formally in
control of that people."' 53 The Court has attempt to define the constitutional
rights in a context of regulatory offence cases, expand the Crown's duties
to consult and accommodate, urge negotiations of new treaties in good
faith with holders of aboriginal rights, and articulate the limits of Crown
infringements of constitutional rights.'54 Such constitutional reconciliation
with the Mawio'mi communal rights is overdue, and much needed to
create honourable governance.
Conclusion
Since the Court's recognition of aboriginal and treaty rights has affirmed
the contemporary jurisgenesis of the Mi'kmaw creation story, the
Crown and its agencies must acknowledge and establish a mechanism
to implement treaty rights and constitutionally reconcile aboriginal
rights of the Mawio'mi. This process should be guided by Mi'kmaw
oral teachings, legal traditions, and the constitutional framework, rather
than shaped by a policy framework developed unilaterally by the Crown.
These teaching, traditions, and treaty are the origin of the constitutional
relationship between the Mawio'mi and the Crown. They generate a sui
generis relationship that is empowered by the core precepts of the honour
of the Crown. This constitutional relationship that has three distinct by
often converging components: a respect for aboriginal law and tenure of
the Mawio'mi, a mutual treaty relationship, and fiduciary relationship
embedded in imperial law. Any of these relations give rise to distinct
constitutional obligations of the Mawio'mi and the Crown that inform the
obligation of honourable governance.
Our history as Mi'kmaq has showed us that we have persevered
through many obstacles and many misfortunes. As Mi'kmaq in Atlantic
Canada we have our own Indigenous laws, yet for a few centuries as today
the courts and politicians have tried to persuade our people that these are
not valid and must be abandoned. However, recent cases such as Simon,
Marshall,and Sappier-Grayhave helped to paint a different picture of our
future. At the same time this trilogy of Mi'kmaq Supreme Court victories
affirm our sacred teaching in the Mi'kmaq creation story. Recent cases
153. Haida Nation, supra note 86 at para. 32.
154. Ibid; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (ProjectAssessment Director), [2004]
3 S.C.R. 550 [Taku River Nation]; Mikisew Cree Nation,supra note 95.
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have pointed out that our laws, embedded in our languages, are important
keys to advancing our rights. While the courts have accepted the arguments
put forward by Mi'kmaw people regarding the meaning of sui generis
treaty and aboriginal rights, it is for us, as Mi'kmaq leaders, now and in
the future, together with Mi'kmaq people to truly define who we are for
ourselves and what laws we seek to hold.
In the past the Mawio'mi has asked elected leadership at the band and
organizational level to work together as a nation and not be divided by
Canada's strategy of using Indian Act bands to carry out a band- by-band
approach to negotiating. This advice was supported in the report of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which advanced a nationhood
approach to problem solving as an answer to the multiple economic and
political issues.
That said, it must be stated that there are many Indian Act chiefs
who have urged working together and gaining capacity as chiefs working
together on behalf of their nation. They, along with the Mawio'mi, argue
that temporary solutions that ignore long-term problems will continue to
lead us down the wrong path. The Harvard project on American Indian
Economic development is one example of research conducted showing
how short-term nonstrategic decision-making is characteristic of the
standard approach of Native Nations.' 55 This approach has resulted in
failed enterprises, highly dependant economies, and continued poverty
and cultural stress. 11 6 This is why different approaches must be taken that
take into consideration long-term strategies that decrease dependency on
year-to-year funding agreements.
The Harvard project on American Indian Economic Development
recommends a "Nation Building Approach".' 5 7 Part of that approach is
having the "governing institution match indigenous political culture".
This cultural match gives legitimacy and respect to the administration and
the nation in the eyes of its membership. Greater respect for laws within
that membership is a direct result, which means an improved and more
efficient government model.
The cultural match model has its difficulties in terms of possible "what
if' scenarios. The problem that many of our leaders point to in terms
of creating custom codes that are based on Mawio'mi laws is that the
approval of the minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern

155. Miriam Jorgensen, ed., Rebuilding Native Nations: Strategiesfor Governance and Development
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007) at 8.
156: Ibid. at 17.
157. Ibid. at 19.
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Development is still needed to change existing citizenship or election
laws. The Minister, of course, could base any refusals on a whim or any
reason at all, as well as on concepts that are Eurocentric in nature, such as
principles of democracy or individualism. This argument is valid in that
there are constitutional challenges to protecting our Mawio'mi laws and
constitutional rights; however, we must not be afraid of temporary failure.
Fear is not part of our constitutional rights, it is a product of racism and
colonialization of our last five generations, which has resulted in cognitive
imperialism.'5 8 During the constitutional table discussion that is showcased
in the documentary "Dancing Around the Table,"'59 The late Joe Mathias,
a leader for the First Nations of British Columbia, stated, " Behold the
turtle, it only moves forward when it sticks its neck out". The Mi'kmaq
must learn how to overcome obstacles in the same way and must take risks
and be bold to make progress and protect Mi'kmaq identity that consists of
political integrity, language and culture.
The Mi'kmaq have always adapted with the times and as we have
evolved in other areas our methods of governance must also evolve. Yet, it
is important to remember that as Mi'kmaq, we must keep those traditions
alive that have set us apart from European or foreign settlers, for in those
differences lay our aboriginal and treaty rights. By valuing our language,
culture and customs and by engaging and learning from our Elders and
knowledge holders, we learn from our land and our ecology, keeping in mind
the responsibilities of being Mi'kmaq and that these are delicate resources
that need to be nourished and protected. We have lived for numerous
centuries in Mi'kma'ki and our multiple generations have learned from
our land, our place, our environment, and we have an immense knowledge
that is useful today as it will be tomorrow. Some of this knowledge we can
share with others and in so doing preserve and protect that knowledge for
future generations. It can help us to understand the full effect of using the
land and resources respectfully, without exploitation of the resources and
the ecosystem.
By continuing Mi'kmaq learning we need to include research of the
language through and with our Elders and knowledge keepers. More
can be learned about Mi'kmaq values, customs and traditions and about
our indigenous laws for our everyday lives, whether as administrators or
as leaders, as fathers and mothers. It is the responsibility of each of us

158. ProtectingIndigenous Knowledge, supranote 65 at 86.
159. Directed by Maurice Bulbullian, Dancing around the Table (1987, National Film Board of
Canada), is a film about the three conferences on the constitutional rights of Aboriginal peoples of
Canada in 1983-85.
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to hold on to Mi'kmaw law and aboriginal and treaty rights. These are
imbedded in responsibilities to retain the teachings, knowledge, values,
and strength of our nation, for now and for the future. Our Mi'kmaq laws
and our population should not be replaced by Canadian influences, which
in a few generations would make it impossible to tell who we are and what
sets us apart from others.
We must use creativity and teamwork to advance our rights and our
rightful place within Atlantic Canada. In so doing, we will ensure our
spot as a prosperous nation, and at the same time ensure that we as well as
others remain respectful of our delicate ecosystem. We have yet to really
reflect as Mi'kmaq on how to move forward while ensuring that we adapt,
evolve, and at the same time renew our traditional laws and values.
In concluding, it is important to acknowledge the value of the courts
in helping to define for Canadians the law of the land, but we recognize
that we cannot depend on them. Rather, it is up to us as Mi'kmaq leaders,
scholars, lawyers, students, teachers, and experts to begin discussing
reconciliation. As Mi'kmaq, how are we to move forward utilizing our
strengths and centuries of experience in Atlantic Canada? Finally, we
must not expect the federal and provincial Crowns, or the judicial system,
to resolve our issues; we must look to our own teachings and balance our
values, principles and goals in a just reconciliation process. By doing so
we can take the first step towards creating a better future not based on
another culture's agenda or rules but rather on what we have always had
within us.

